HEADQUARTERS, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS, IRAQ
Baghdad, Iraq, APO AE 09342
1 JUN 07

MNC-I OPERATIONS ORDER 07-01 (U)
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1. (S//REL) **Situation**. This order supersedes OPORD 06-03, 5 Nov 06, and serves as the base guidance for Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) operations beginning 1 June 2007. This order reflects changes in the environment of conflict and directs a reorientation of MNC-I's operational focus from the past year. OPORD 07-01 provides a framework for a long-term campaign as well as more specific guidance to MNC-I's subordinates for the next twelve to fifteen months.

   a. (S//REL) "Filling the Gap". Developments in the years following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime have resulted in what is essentially *a communal struggle for power and survival* among rival factions and ethnic and sectarian groups making up Iraq's diverse political and social landscape. The defining feature of this complex struggle has been violence of a kind and scale that has served to destabilize much of the country and polarize the population along ethnic and sectarian lines. An insurgency comprised of multiple Sunni groups challenges the legitimacy of the Shia-dominated Government of Iraq (GOI) and perpetuates sectarian violence, making reconciliation between Sunni and Shia exceedingly difficult and encouraging Kurdish expansionism as this ethnic group – like others – positions itself for future conflict. Takfiri terrorist activities, such as those carried out by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and the continuing role of unsupportive or hostile external actors in the region exacerbate the conflict. Underlying and contributing to the general condition of instability are the characteristics of a failed state, presided over by a government that cannot (or, in some cases, for sectarian reasons *chooses* not to) fulfill its basic responsibilities to all Iraqis. Thus for several reasons, there is a "gap" between the GOI and its people. Many groups are struggling to fill this gap and exert control over segments of the population in order to achieve their own goals. It is in the Coalition's best interest for a legitimate, capable GOI to "fill the gap," serving as the protector of its people and the guarantor of their basic needs. MNC-I must pressure the GOI to take meaningful steps to gain legitimacy and support the GOI as it attempts to fill the gap in this struggle, with concentration on the population of Baghdad as the first priority. Given the legacy of sectarian and ethnic strife in Iraq, this process will take time. As part of a larger effort, MNC-I must apply maximum leverage in the time available to improve stability in the near-term in order to create space for political progress that leads to a negotiated settlement, sustainable security, and ultimately Iraqi self-reliance.

   b. (U) Assumptions. The direction within this campaign plan is based upon the following assumptions:

      (1) (S//REL) By Sep 07, the MNC-I commander will assess that conditions in Iraq have sufficiently improved and will make a recommendation to continue with the general approach outlined in this document (OPORD 07-01).

      (2) (S//REL) External military aggression by conventional forces will not significantly threaten Iraq.

      (3) (S//REL) The USG will continue to support the current GOI.

(4) (S//REL) Absent external influences, the GOI will edge toward a pattern of sectarian-based behavior that destabilizes Iraq.

(5) (S//REL) The GOI will continue to accept the presence of Coalition Forces (CF) in Iraq, but, after United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1723 expires, those forces will operate with reduced authorities.

(6) (S//REL) The GOI will not request that the UN mandate for MNF-I be terminated prior to 31 Dec 07.

(7) (S//REL) MNF-I will be able to maintain twenty U.S. BCTs in the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) for several months, with a reduction in force beginning no earlier than Nov 07.

(8) (S//REL) Once the reduction of U.S. BCTs begins, force levels in ITO will not rise again; there will be no more "plus-up."

(9) (S//REL) The long-term security arrangement between the USG and GOI will involve the presence of at least four U.S. BCTs on Iraqi soil for a period of five to ten years.

(10) (S//REL) MARCENT will provide a MEF (Fwd) in ITO through 2009.

(11) (S//REL) OCF-I operations will continue through 2009 against AQ/AQI.

(12) (S//REL) CJSOTF-AP will retain the equivalent of one Special Forces Group in ITO through 2009.

(13) (S//REL) The UK will maintain a division headquarters and, at a minimum, a brigade-sized force in southern Iraq through 2009.

(14) (S//REL) MND-CS headquarters will remain in ITO through Dec 07, at which time it will redeploy without backfill.

(15) (S//REL) MND-NE headquarters will remain in ITO through Dec 08, at which time it will redeploy without backfill.

(16) (S//REL) GEO will contribute one BDE(-) to the Coalition – a commitment beginning in Fall 2007 and lasting until Jun 08.

(17) (S//REL) Ten embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) will remain in ITO for as long as U.S. force levels stay at ten BCTs or higher.

c. (S//REL) Threat Situation. The threat environment in Iraq consists of four interacting conflicts: counter-occupation, terrorism, insurgency and a communal struggle for power

and survival, occurring in the context of failing state and complicated by the external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian, and Arab civilizations.

(1) (S//REL) Counter-occupation is an implicit cultural norm that calls for Muslim populations to oppose non-Muslim forces on Muslim soil. This predisposes the Iraqi populace to at least passively support attacks against Coalition Forces and contributes to Iraqi youth vulnerability to recruitment by more violent elements.

(2) (S//REL) Terrorism in Iraq is connected to Al Qaeda's global jihad that aims to create a virtual caliphate which is facilitated by regional terrorist and foreign fighter networks. The primary terrorist organizations in Iraq are the Sunni Extremist groups of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and to a lesser extent, Ansar Al Sunnah (AAS). Sunni Extremist brutal and excessive tactics such as the use of suicide bombers, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and targeting fellow Muslims have eroded its popular support base. Sunni Extremist terrorism overlaps with the Sunni Rejectionist insurgency. Their intermediate objectives of weakening the Shia-dominated government coincide. However, the Sunni Extremist objective of creating a failed state to serve as a terrorist sanctuary from which to launch a global jihad is mutually exclusive with the Sunni Rejectionist objective of re-establishing a Sunni-dominated Government of Iraq that is eventually at peace with its neighbors.

(3) (S//REL) The insurgency in Iraq is an almost exclusively Sunni Rejectionist movement aimed at regaining former power and influence. The principal Sunni Rejectionist groups are the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al Mujahidin, and the more nationalistic elements of Ansar al Sunnah. The Sunni Rejectionist goal at restoring Sunni power is just one part of the ongoing communal struggle for power and survival.

(4) (S//REL) The communal struggle for power and survival is occurring both between and among the various ethno-sectarian groups. The major Shia groups of SCIRI, Badr, OMS and Fadilah are working together to prevent the Sunni resurgence, but fight among themselves for Shia dominance. The primary Kurdish groups: the KDP and PUK are working to increase Kurd autonomy and extend the limits of Kurdistan where possible. The potential expansion of Kurdistan is opposed by both Sunni and Shia Arabs, as well as by minorities such as the Turkomen. Sunni tribes are banding together to fight AQI, but may pose a challenge to Sunni provincial and national politicians as the tribal influence grows.

(5) (S//REL) The GOI's capacity to respond to the interacting conflicts is hindered by its current condition as a failing state. The GOI is struggling to develop the governmental, ministerial and security capacity to deal with the threats that confront it. The external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian and Arab civilizations increase the complexity of GOI's situation and reduce the likelihood of solutions agreeable to all actors.

d. (U) Friendly Forces.

(1) (U) <u>Higher Headquarters</u>.

    (a) (U) <u>United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)</u>.

        1. ~~(FOUO)~~ <u>Mission</u>. USCENTCOM conducts operations to attack, disrupt, and defeat terrorism, deter and defeat adversaries, deny access to WMD, assure regional access, strengthen regional stability, build the self-reliance of partner nations' security forces, and protect the vital interests of the United States within the area of responsibility.

        2. (U) <u>Commander's Intent</u>.

           a. ~~(FOUO)~~ <u>Purpose</u>. USCENTCOM remains engaged in the Central Region for three vital purposes: (1) prevent attacks on the United States and key partner nations, (2) protect access and flow of strategic resources to global markets, and (3) prevail against adversaries.

           b. (U) <u>Key Tasks</u>.

               (1). ~~(FOUO)~~ Defeat al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM).
               (2). ~~(FOUO)~~ Defeat insurgencies and stabilize friendly governments.
               (3). ~~(FOUO)~~ Deter or defeat state-sponsored aggression.
               (4). ~~(FOUO)~~ Deny adversaries WMD/E access, proliferation, and use.
               (5). ~~(FOUO)~~ Prevent attacks and reduce vulnerability.
               (6). ~~(FOUO)~~ Adapt theater force posture to the changing situation.
               (7). ~~(FOUO)~~ Secure key lines of communication.
               (8). ~~(FOUO)~~ Develop and improve the security capabilities of our allies and partners.

           c. ~~(FOUO)~~ <u>End State</u>. Adversaries will either be deterred or defeated. Iraq and Afghanistan will be stabilized.   Unfriendly states will be deterred from threatening U.S. and partner interests. Enemy actions will be disrupted before effects are achieved and WMD proliferation and use prevented. Terrorism throughout the theater will be defeated. AQAM and its ideology will be rejected and actively opposed by local populations. State and non-state actors will no longer sponsor terrorism as an instrument of politics. Regional stability will be reinforced with strong, formal, and informal relationships established among regional nations and states. Regional cooperation reduces the likelihood of state failure. Allies and partners will be able to secure their own borders and stand ready to assist us in defeating any adversaries across the spectrum of conflict. Regional access will be assured with redundant facilities throughout the theater. Supporting bilateral and multilateral agreements will be in place. Key lines of communication will remain open and the flow of strategic resources will continue unimpeded and unobstructed

from the global commons. The vital interests and key infrastructure of US and partner nations will remain protected and attacks against US and partner nations will be prevented.

(b) (U) <u>Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)</u>.

1. (S//REL) <u>Mission</u>. [DRAFT] The Coalition, in partnership with the GOI, employs integrated political, security, economic, diplomatic, and informational means to help the people of Iraq achieve sustainable security by the spring of 2009 and to advance reconciliation and political and economic development.

2. (U) <u>Commander's Intent</u>. [DRAFT]

a. (S//REL) The intent by the spring of 2009 is to have reached a point where sustainable security has been established nationwide and reconciliation and political and economic development are being advanced. This will be achieved in two phases.

b. (S//REL) In the near term, the downward spiral of sectarian violence will be halted by further developing existing security lines of operation to protect the population and render irreconcilable groups less effective while concurrently developing and employing political, economic, and diplomatic policies and initiatives that will move reconcilable groups and the political establishment of Iraq towards political accommodation.

c. (S//REL) During the intermediate term, the emphasis will shift from suppressing violence to creating sustainable security through the emerging effects of improved governance, political accommodation, and economic development while still maintaining security operations. Throughout the period, we will work to develop the ability of the GOI to fulfill its governance and security obligations through capacity development, security sector reform, and neutralizing malign sectarian elements. These operations will be conducted in partnership with the GOI and transfer of control will continue in accordance with conditions-based understandings developed over the near term. We will also work through national Coalition Governments to create and maintain an effective international support network that will help the GOI to counter subversive interference by malign neighbors and support economic and political development.

d. (S//REL) Success over the long term will be characterized by the ability to move to subsequent operations in which the GOI incrementally assumes self-sufficiency while the Coalition contributes in accordance with security, political, and economic agreements and helps Iraq achieve the long-term goal of: Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the

War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order, defend Iraq's territorial integrity, and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.

3. (S//REL) Lines of Operation (LOO) and Integration of Efforts. [DRAFT] The Coalition's strategy through June 2009 is built on four lines of operation: Political, Security, Economic, and Diplomatic, with the political line as the supported strategy. These are interwoven with efforts to build governance capacity, communicate strategically, spread the rule of law, and bring about reconciliation between competing actors. The strategy uses an integrated engagement approach, combining persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means. The most critical aspect of this strategy is the deliberate integration of these efforts to achieve both near and intermediate term campaign objectives. It centers on strategically-executed engagements with key leaders and groups, both inside and outside of the GOI, to bring them to accommodation, using all aspects of Coalition power and influence to create the conditions for sustainable security. The LOOs integrate as such:

   a. (S//REL) Political LOO. Since political accommodation is the goal, the political strategy drives all Coalition operations and programs. The political line of operation, executed by all components of the Coalition, uniformed and civilian, moves the GOI and Iraq's communities toward political accommodation based upon a foundation of security and an ever-growing web of economic, informational, and diplomatic support, while simultaneously building governance capacity and establishing the rule of law.

   b. (S//REL) Security, Economic, Diplomatic LOOs and Supporting Efforts. The other lines of operation support and integrate with the political effort, but all work, directly and indirectly, towards achieving political accommodation. The security line supports political accommodation through establishing a baseline foundation of security that will enable political engagement to flourish through confidence and mutual trust. This will be complemented by targeted security operations to move armed parties to the negotiating table or to induce them to compromise in negotiation. The security line of operation simultaneously conducts counterterrorism operations and leads security sector reform (which is carefully coordinated with building similar trust and capacity elsewhere in the GOI). The economic line of operation provides leverage for political efforts, but initially focuses on activities that contribute to security. Economic activities concentrate on budget execution and include short-term reconstruction and employment initiatives, government performance improvements, and capacity building in key ministries and at the provincial and local levels. Some tradeoffs will be necessary, but near- and intermediate-term efforts must set conditions

and buy time for long-term economic development to take root. The diplomatic line of operations supports the political line through engagement with countries in the region and the broader international community (to include extension of the Coalition's legal authority for security operations in Iraq) to provide an environment to support and further internal reconciliation efforts. Strategic communication, establishing the supporting rule-of-law structure, and targeted engagement efforts are integrated into all lines of operation and are key to their individual and integrated success.

4. (U) Campaign Goals. [DRAFT]

 a. (S//REL) Near Term: (6 to 12 months). Baseline security established locally, sufficient to allow broad engagement (i.e., irreconcilable armed groups rendered less effective, large scale sectarian violence reduced); substantial progress on localized political accommodations; continuous economic and political development; and a security situation that enables CF withdrawal.

 b. (S//REL) Intermediate Term (12 to 24 months). Sustainable security established nationwide; further reconciliation and political and economic development become self-sustaining.

 c. (S//REL) Long Term (Multiple Years). Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order, defend Iraq's territorial integrity, and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.

(2) (U) Adjacent Units.

(a) (U) Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC). The IGFC is an adjacent corps level command. Although the IGFC is an independent adjacent headquarters, MNC-I retains tactical and operational overwatch responsibilities for IA units. MNC-I provides operational overwatch for provinces that have attained Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) even if they are wholly within operational environment allotted to the IGFC.

(b) (S//REL) Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). MNSTC-I assists the GOI in the development, organization, training, equipping, and sustainment of the ISF and key ministries (e.g., defense, interior).

(c) (S//REL) TF 1.4a TF 1.4a conducts detainee operations by exercising command and control over Coalition detention, interrogation, and legal referral operations above division level, and coordinating detainee operations between GOI, DoD,

Coalition Forces, Department of State, interagency organizations, and NGO human rights organizations.

(d) (S//REL) Gulf Region Division (GRD). Assists in the reconstruction of Iraq by providing engineering services to MNF-I and the GOI in order to rebuild critical infrastructure and provide essential services throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations.

(e) (S//REL) OCF-I. In partnership with the GOI and other U.S. agencies, OCF-I is principally responsible for targeting AQI.

2. (S//REL) **Mission**. MNC-I conducts combat and stability operations in coordination with the ISF to secure the population, defeat terrorists and irreconcilable extremists, neutralize insurgent and militia groups, and transition responsibilities to the ISF in order to reduce violence, gain the support of the people, stabilize Iraq, and enable GOI security self-reliance. NLT December 2007, we will establish improved stability and create irreversible momentum, leading to wide-ranging political accommodation and sustainable security by Spring 2009 and to the ultimate goal of self-reliance in the longer term.

3. (U) **Execution**.

   a. (U) Commander's Intent.

      (1) (S//REL) Purpose. The purpose of our operations is to bring *stability* to Iraq and then to sustain it in order to create time and space for the Iraqis to make progress toward political accommodation, continued political and economic development, and ultimately *self-reliance*. We accomplish this first by *securing the population of Iraq*, with priority to Baghdad, followed by the nine strategic cities and the rest of the country. Additionally, we must continue to support the development of a capable GOI and ISF so that both are viewed as legitimate and credible in the eyes of Iraqis. In order to *sustain stability over time*, we help build governmental capacity, strengthen GOI legitimacy, reduce sectarian behavior in Iraqi security institutions, and deliberately transition security responsibilities to the ISF as they demonstrate appropriate readiness to assume them. All of this leads to Iraqi *self-reliance*, creating the conditions for a peaceful, stable Iraq, led by a representative government subscribing to the rule of law, able to provide security for its people, and denying its territory as a terrorist safe haven.

      (2) (U) Key Tasks.

         (a) (S//REL) *Protect the population*, with priority to where ethno-sectarian violence undermines the security situation; implement appropriate population control measures, and establish a persistent presence in Iraqi neighborhoods to improve security and address local grievances; rekindle hope among the people by making progress toward a secure environment, sustained increasingly by a more capable, credible ISF.

(b) (S//REL) *Facilitate reconciliation* among key internal actors competing for power in Iraq; conduct engagement with potentially reconcilable factions and apply persuasive, cooperative, and coercive means as leverage to support negotiations leading to local ceasefires or political compromises with the GOI; at local and provincial levels, promote dialogue across sectarian lines.

(c) (S//REL) *Defeat AQI and extremists*; kill them, capture them, or drive them toward reconciliation; render ineffective their efforts to foment sectarian violence and derail progress toward political accommodation and economic development.

(d) (S//REL) *Continue to develop ISF capacity* through partnership, enhanced transition teams, and advisory / assistance units; we must work to make the ISF more professional by improving unit combat effectiveness, reducing sectarianism, and growing quality leaders – to include commissioned officers and NCOs.

(e) (S//REL) *Assist efforts to build and improve GOI capacity*, focusing on essential services, accountable local governance, and sustainable economic development; in careful coordination with this support, promote non-sectarian behavior while contributing to efforts to remove GOI officials who adhere to sectarian agendas.

(f) (S//REL) *Protect the force* through proactive, focused, continuous, and precise offensive operations specifically against indirect-fire and IED networks; synchronize all available assets, to include air and ground reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and properly integrate them to counter these threats.

(3) (S//REL) End State. In the *near term*, an improved level of stability is achieved; the population is secure and conditions are set for the restoration of civil authority in Iraq, with priority to Baghdad; sectarian violence is reduced and militia influence is diminished. GOI legitimacy is enhanced as the Iraqi government demonstrates increased ability to provide security, essential services, justice based on the rule of law, and economic opportunity for all Iraqis. Iraqi Security Forces, while continuing to build capacity, are in the lead – for the most part – with CF in tactical or operational overwatch. AQI and other extremists are neutralized and under persistent CF and ISF pressure. Their freedom of action is limited, and their operations are unable to disrupt progress toward political accommodation where ceasefires exist. In the *longer term*, Iraq is self-reliant and politically stable with the institutions and resources it needs to govern justly, secure from internal and external threats, inaccessible as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated into the international community as an engine for regional economic growth.

b. (U) Concept of the Operation.

(1) (U) Key Judgments and Vision.

(a) (S//REL) Achieving the campaign's end state of Iraqi self-reliance will take years, likely necessitating a long-term (though much reduced) Coalition Force presence. Time is required due to the complexity of the environment, which is shaped by the interaction of multiple competing groups and sub-groups inside Iraq, the influence of external actors, the sectarian and ethnic violence characterizing the current conflict, and the country's troubled past. However, time is a luxury the Coalition does not have.

(b) (S//REL) Currently, MNC-I has the potential to apply maximum leverage as part of a Coalition effort to facilitate negotiations aimed at local ceasefires and a broader political settlement among the several groups competing for power in Iraq. By the end of 2007, much of this leverage could begin to dissipate due to a few related factors, such as a new UNSCR, a change in U.S. national strategy regarding Iraq, and assertiveness on the part of a GOI pressing for tangible recognition of its sovereignty. Any could lead to a premature reduction in the number of BCTs or to restrictions on Coalition authorities (and thus CF freedom of action). Although these factors lie beyond MNC-I's ability to directly influence, they could have a significant impact on how the corps conducts operations. Thus, they shape our approach. *We must make visible progress soon* in order to generate momentum and buy time for the Coalition to meet its long-term goals in Iraq. "Filling the gap" with a legitimate GOI will only come through a combination of security, improved governance, and economic development. Security constitutes the visible progress we need in the coming months and creates momentum and space for the GOI to take meaningful steps forward in those areas that require a longer period to yield results. Security synchronized with effective governance and economic development can succeed, but it will take great political effort on the part of the GOI, as well as a serious commitment to reconciliation.

(c) (S//REL) The time in which we can apply maximum leverage – between now and the end of 2007 – is *the critical period*. MNC-I will direct its efforts in the near term toward achieving *an improved level of stability*, attained during Dec 07 and characterized by a significant reduction in sectarian violence (principally in Baghdad) and substantial progress toward reconciliation. This improvement in the near term will set the conditions for increasing stability further over time, creating an environment whereby security for the population is sustained, advances in Iraqi governance and economic development can proceed, and progress toward a negotiated political settlement (with a target date of Dec 08) can be made. As the situation improves with political accommodation and the defeat of irreconcilable extremists, MNC-I adjusts its posture and the focus of its effort. The Coalition continues and ultimately completes the transition of security responsibilities to the Iraqis while deliberately reducing its military presence in the country. MNC-I sustains stability in conjunction with a steadily increasing Iraqi role and supports the ISF and GOI but does so at decreased levels. As progress toward the campaign end state of *Iraqi self-reliance*

continues, an Office of Security Cooperation assumes security-related responsibilities for the Coalition in Iraq.

(2) (S//REL) Operational Framework and Phasing. As MNC-I improves stability in the near term on its way to achieving the end state of Iraqi self-reliance, the corps makes progress along purpose-based LOOs. These LOOs form part of an operational framework that organizes and guides MNC-I actions so that the corps maintains focus and unity of effort as it pursues its objectives. Each LOO leads to two to four operational objectives, and each objective is associated with two sets of conditions. *End state conditions* are conditions related to the accomplishment of the objective. *Near-term conditions* serve as an indicator for priority of effort along the LOO and provide a means of assessing progress as MNC-I approaches the end of the critical period in Dec 07. The end of MNC-I's critical period corresponds with an MNF-I/USM-I decision point. Prior to this decision point, MNF-I/USM-I will conduct an interim assessment in Sep 07 in order to determine whether there are noticeable trends toward political accommodation in Iraq. The assessment associated with the Dec 07 decision point will either confirm progress or shape decisions regarding potential branches. There are *five phases of the MNC-I campaign*. Whereas the operational framework relates campaign progress throughout Iraq to time in a general sense, the phasing construct acknowledges the diverse conditions existing in different areas of operation. It provides a framework for characterizing the relationship between CF and the Iraqi forces sharing their operational environment, as well as the security conditions that help to define that relationship. These factors vary by province and even locale, and thus areas will progress through phases at different rates.

Figure 1, (S//REL) MNC-I Operational Framework

(a) (S//REL) Lines of Operation. There are three primary LOOs – Secure Environment; Capable, Credible ISF; and Legitimate, Capable GOI. Effective Communications are critical to the effort and are integrated into all LOOs. Simultaneous progress along each of the LOOs will lead to an improved level of stability and, later, self-reliance.

1. (U) LOO 1 – Secure Environment.

a. (S//REL) General. MNC-I has two key opportunities on which to capitalize in the coming months. The "plus-up" to twenty U.S. BCTs allows the corps to concentrate additional forces in Baghdad and the Baghdad Belts without having to shift Coalition units from other areas where their continued presence is required. Second, certain Sunni groups have been progressively more inclined to cooperate with CF due to AQI's brutal tactics and effective CF and ISF counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism efforts. This opportunity is most promising in Anbar, but similar signs are emerging in Diyala and Salah ad Din. MNC-I must exploit the openings available for making political and military gains against AQI and increasingly connect the largely disenfranchised Sunni population to the GOI. Mere physical security is not sufficient. Iraqis

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regardless of ethnicity or sect must come to believe that they live in a secure environment, controlled to an extent that allows them to gain confidence in the ability of the ISF and GOI to provide for their security needs in an unbiased manner and over the long term. This will encourage the people to become active participants in the government, supporting the GOI in the struggle against AQI and the insurgents. Establishing an increasingly secure environment contributes to stability and sets the conditions for political progress in the areas of reconciliation, improvements in governance at the local and provincial level, and economic development. As such, efforts along the Secure Environment LOO must be synchronized and integrated with other LOOs.

b. (S//REL) Baghdad – the Main Effort. The *main security effort* of the campaign is protecting the population of Iraq, with priority first to Baghdad and then to the strategic cities. CF and ISF secure the people of Baghdad while outlying MND/Fs interdict accelerants to sectarian violence and deny them the sanctuary within the Baghdad Belts. Efforts to break the cycle of sectarian violence include a balanced approach in the application of population control measures, as well as in the conduct of [1.4c] operations against Sunni and Shia extremists. CJSOTF-AP plays a key role in the latter through operations to disrupt extra-judicial killing (EJK) networks as well as AQI's ability to carry out high-profile attacks in Baghdad. It conducts these in coordination with MND-B and in conjunction with Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF). Persistent CF and ISF presence and more frequent security operations in mixed Sunni and Shia areas help mitigate the effects of a possible resurgence of extremist Shia militia activity against Sunnis. Concurrently, CF and ISF efforts to improve security in Shia areas are aimed at making the role militias play increasingly irrelevant, protecting the Shia population against AQI high-profile attacks as well as Sunni reprisals. The most effective techniques for securing the populace in and around Baghdad include JSSs, Coalition outposts (COPs), and ongoing initiatives such as "safe markets" and "safe neighborhoods."

c. (S//REL) Supporting Efforts. Although the main effort is protecting the population of Baghdad, supporting security efforts continue throughout Iraq. In Anbar, MNC-I exploits the inroads made with Sunni tribes to improve population security, making progress toward defeating AQI and neutralizing Sunni insurgent groups. In the northern provinces, the initial priority goes to protecting the populace of Diyala and Southern Salah ad Din, where the effects of CF pressure in Baghdad have resulted in an escalation of AQI and insurgent activity. Indications of increased AQI and insurgent activity in Mosul as well place importance on denying that strategic city and its environs as a sanctuary. Careful

monitoring of the situation around Kirkuk will also be crucial. While there is little that CF can do from a practical military standpoint to stop Kurdish expansionism, MNC-I must engage local leaders to discourage aggressive manifestations of it and help prevent Sunni tribes from cooperating with AQI as a result. In the Kurdish region itself, MNC-I maintains the current levels of stability. In the southern provinces, CF take measures to ensure intra-Shia conflict remains localized and does not threaten CF lines of communication. Throughout the country, CJSOTF-AP supports the effort by conducting tribal engagement to deny extremist sanctuary, disrupting EJK networks, and disrupting the flow of terrorists and foreign fighters along the primary infiltration routes into Iraq.

d. (S//REL) Border Security. MNC-I contributes to higher-level political and diplomatic strategies designed to reduce malign external influences by improving Iraq's border security in conjunction with the GOI.

1.4b, 1.4d
1.4b, 1.4d

See Appendix 10, Annex C.

e. (S//REL) Reconciliation and Engagement. It is unrealistic to expect stability to come through a wholesale military defeat of the insurgency in Iraq. MNC-I will execute a broad-based and integrated reconciliation and engagement effort at all levels using a bottom-up approach with top-down refinement and resourcing. The focus is to engage key communicators across the tribal, religious, and political spectrum in order to cause the Iraqis to actively resist and fight AQI, to work with the ISF, and to become part of the political process. Overall, this will help to reduce violence, neutralize the insurgency, and connect Iraq's national government to provinces, cities, and villages throughout the country. *Iraqis are the ones who reconcile; leaders in MNC-I work to persuade and encourage them to participate in the process.* CF commanders facilitate reconciliation with the GOI through engagement leading to local ceasefires between fighting elements while simultaneously conducting offensive operations against irreconcilables (such as AQI) and extremist or insurgent organizations that choose not to participate in or adhere to negotiations. MNC-I establishes a Reconciliation and Engagement Cell as a mechanism to guide local-level engagements aimed at reconciliation and to complement the top-down approach to engagement currently taken by MNF-I/USM-I. See Appendix 6, Annex C.

f. (S//REL) Counter-IED Effort. While protecting the Iraqi populace is MNC-I's primary focus in the Secure Environment LOO, maintaining CF freedom of movement and protecting the force remain key requirements that allow the corps to pursue its operational objectives.

To this end, MNC-I adopts an offensive mindset in the fight to counter the enemy's employment of IEDs against CF and ISF. The MNC-I Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC) will be the principal mechanism for synchronizing the corps effort, leveraging all available intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets to not only defeat the device but, more importantly, disrupt or neutralize the IED networks themselves. See Appendices 5 and 9, Annex C.

g. (S//REL) Operational Reserve. MNC-I maintains an operational reserve in order to provide the commander with the flexibility to apply additional combat power rapidly and where it is needed most. In most cases, the force will consist of one Stryker Battalion because of that unit's high level of operational mobility. MNC-I will issue fragmentary orders directing the operational reserve's employment. In all likelihood, it will not be "held in reserve" but will be a committed force. However, to facilitate the reserve's ability to disengage and move elsewhere on short notice, the MND/F to which it is committed will not assign the battalion to an AO where it would be expected to establish long-term relationships with local ISF or government officials and the populace. The reserve will be an "above-ground" force that can quickly extricate itself from an operational environment. Typically, the order to re-position or re-mission the reserve will come with the following time requirements: 1) one company and a battalion TAC within [1.4a] hours of notification; 2) the remainder of the battalion within [1.4a] [1.4a] hours of notification.

2. (S//REL) LOO 2 – Capable, Credible ISF. Despite the shift in emphasis from facilitating transition to population security, establishing a capable, credible ISF remains central to improving stability. The development of ISF that operate in a non-sectarian manner contributes to a secure environment. Moreover, it is an unavoidable fact that transition will have to occur in some form when CF levels decrease substantially. MNC-I's efforts along the Capable, Credible ISF LOO set the conditions to make the transition of security responsibilities in Iraq one that leads ultimately to enduring self-reliance.

a. (S//REL) Developing ISF Capability. MNC-I will continue its effort to develop ISF capability throughout the duration of the campaign and will do so through a variety of means, namely partnership, enhanced transition teams, and advisory/assistance brigades. MSCs tailor their approach in time and space according to local conditions to account for differences in the performance level of individual ISF units, the number of units requiring coverage, the threat situation, and the ability of provincial governments to coordinate security forces. Because ISF units throughout Iraq are at different stages of development, CF maintain flexibility in developing ISF capability, adapting their posture to

improvements in conditions rather than following a pre-determined progression. For the BCT commander, transition teams remain a key tool. The corps adheres to a BCT-centric approach in its employment of transition teams. A fixed number of teams are attached to each MND/F so that they can be allocated based on the assessments of division and BCT commanders, who prioritize coverage on the more critical ISF units in their AOs and accept risk where they deem it appropriate to do so. CJSOTF-AP plays a crucial role in developing ISF capability as well, partnering with ISOF and conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID) – increasingly with other ISF units that demonstrate non-sectarian behavior and exceptional aptitude for independent COIN operations. For details on developing ISF capability, see Appendix 2, Annex C.

(1). (S//REL) Partnership. Partnership provides the highest degree of CF-ISF interaction and is best suited for more demanding security situations. CF units generally partner one level up (i.e. U.S. battalion to Iraqi brigade) and supplement this relationship with leader engagement at the same echelon (i.e. U.S. BCT commander to Iraqi brigade commander). Habitual partner relationships extend down to company and platoon level and involve interaction in both combat and training environments. Partnership implies CF forward presence and the "24/7 coverage" of ISF units, particularly those that require extra attention due to their relative inexperience or suspected sectarian behavior. In some areas of operation (AO), Joint Security Stations provide the mechanism for this high degree of coverage. In any case, the intent is that elements of CF and ISF units in a partner relationship live, work, and fight together in a combined effort to protect the population. Additionally, partnered units conduct combined operations – planning, coordinating, and executing operations together with increasing ISF lead as appropriate. Partnership is coordinated with the activities of transition teams. Embedded transition teams provide some consistency to CF interaction with the ISF, particularly at the senior levels of Iraqi battalions, brigades, and divisions. Using a teach-coach-mentor approach, transition teams advise and assist ISF commanders and staffs as they develop unit systems.

(2). (S//REL) Enhanced Transition Teams. As the local security situation improves and as ISF capability grows, Iraqi units increasingly take the lead, and CF assume an overwatch role. This shift in approach to developing ISF capability facilitates the transition from Iraqi-led operations to more independent Iraqi operations. Though primarily conditions-based, the decision to adopt this approach entails accepting some risk due to the reduction of CF involvement and overt presence and the potential for ISF regression. CF form enhanced transition teams, allowing teams to secure themselves as they operate with Iraqi units. The

enhancement also allows the teams to monitor ISF performance and behavior more thoroughly ("24/7 coverage" as required) and to extend the teach-coach-mentor methodology down to company and platoon level, providing an effect similar to that achieved through partnership despite the reduction of CF forward presence. CF source the enhancement of the transition teams internally and are able to do so because of a deliberate reduction in the scope of missions that CF perform (coupled with a corresponding rise in the security responsibilities local ISF units assume). Although the allocation of available forces used to enhance transition teams in an AO will depend on several factors, a CF battalion might commit a platoon to each Military or National Police Transition Team (MiTT or NPTT), a squad to each Police Transition Team (PTT), and company-sized force to serve as a local quick-reaction force (QRF). To continue executing counter-terrorism operations in a responsive manner, CF retain local time-sensitive targeting forces that are not committed to supporting the ISF on a routine basis.

(3). (S//REL) Advisory/Assistance Brigades. As ISF units become more independent in their operations, CF organize along functional lines to form Strike BCTs and Advisory/Assistance Brigades. These are two distinct types of units, and they fulfill different roles. Strike BCTs perform offensive operations and area security operations and have no responsibilities associated with directly supporting the ISF. These responsibilities are primarily assumed by Advisory/Assistance Brigades. This shift in approach allows MNC-I to sustain its effort to develop ISF capability as overall CF levels in Iraq decrease.

(a). (S//REL) As part of this concept, an Advisory/Assistance Brigade provides tailored support to ISF units in its assigned AO with: tactical and technical advice and assistance in keeping with the teach-coach-mentor approach, access to enablers on a limited basis, emergency combat service support (CSS), and training support. It conducts engagement with local Iraqi leaders and, in conjunction with PRTs, improves the capacity of governance while monitoring and reporting on the progress of ISF and GOI development in its AO. The brigade provides coverage on a rotational basis to all types of ISF units, including army, national police, police, strategic infrastructure units, and elements of the Department of Border Enforcement, and focuses on this function to the exclusion of independent counterinsurgency, counter-terrorism, and area security operations.

(b). (S//REL) An Advisory/Assistance Brigade can focus on supporting the Iraqis for two reasons: improved security conditions and improvement in overall ISF capacity; and the integration of Strike BCTs in the operational environment.

Strike BCTs under the direction of CF division-level commanders remain postured for rapid, decisive intervention and can execute these operations to deal with contingencies as required. More routinely, they conduct base and route security, as well as Coalition-led counter-terrorism operations. Employing elements of Strike BCTs in operational environments belonging to other brigades comes with certain risks that will require mitigation through control measures and close coordination.

(c). (S//REL) In the longer term, organizations external to the Iraqi Theater of Operations will play a major role in preparing selected BCTs in the OIF rotation for their employment as Advisory/Assistance Brigades by providing them the proper personnel, equipment, and training prior to their deployment.

(d). (S//REL) In the near term, Advisory/Assistance Brigades are constituted from BCTs that are reorganized and re-missioned to perform in their new role. Existing transition teams are effectively disbanded, and their personnel are assigned to the brigade and given positions on advisory/assistance teams in order to leverage their rank and experience. Maneuver battalions form the core of these subordinate advisory/assistance teams, with appropriate representation across the warfighting functions drawn from the BCT's organic Fires Battalion, Brigade Troops Battalion, and Brigade Support Battalion, along with an attached military police company to provide the personnel for continued support to the Iraqi police.

(e). (S//REL) These teams are robust enough to secure themselves as they move throughout the AO and provide rotational coverage at a frequency and duration determined by the brigade or division commander. Commanders can flexibly apply this concept. For example, a particular ISF unit might require "24/7 coverage," and one battalion-sized advisory/assistance team could provide it. Under certain conditions, a commander might also employ a team that focuses on supporting Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and Port of Entry (POE) units along stretch of border. To provide additional protection to its teams, the Advisory/Assistance Brigade maintains its own internal QRF – particularly for use in the event that teams find themselves in an immediate tactical crisis.

(f). (S//REL) This concept requires further development. It is based on the realistic assumption that MNC-I will *not* have the manpower to provide transition team coverage to *all* ISF units *all* of the time for as long as CF remain in Iraq. The

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intent of the Advisory/Assistance Brigade concept is to mitigate the risks associated with continuing to support the ISF in conjunction with a reduction in the number of BCTs in the ITO, as well as the principal challenge that will emerge as a result of that reduction – namely, the requirement to protect transition teams dispersed over a wide area and relatively distant from other CF.

b. (S//REL) <u>Reducing Sectarian Behavior in the ISF</u>. The presence of sectarian leaders in the ISF is one of the main obstacles to ISF credibility. It hampers reconciliation and undermines the willingness of the people to invest hope and trust in the vision of an inclusive, representative GOI. While the emphasis is on working alongside ISF as a means of developing their capability, units should be prepared to apply leverage in creative and potentially confrontational ways to address the problem of sectarian behavior. In support of a broader Coalition effort, MNC-I aggressively seeks to reduce destructive sectarianism in the ISF and assists in vetting candidates for key leadership positions with the goal of promoting non-sectarian behavior. To this end, MNC-I leaders will monitor their ISF counterparts, report on instances or trends of sectarian behavior, and compile evidence to support the removal of malign and ineffective leaders. MNC-I ensures that assessment methodologies are in place to assist subordinates along these lines. Actions taken will be executed IAW "rules of engagement" related to reducing sectarian behavior (TBP). Providing "24/7" CF oversight of suspected sectarian units may be one such action, as would escalating the level of intrusiveness even further if it serves to achieve the desired effect. Taking more serious actions will be carefully considered and approved at the appropriate level. Such actions may include withholding support from ISF units behaving in a sectarian manner and perhaps going so far as to disarm them with or without GOI support. See "Unacceptable Sectarian Behavior" in paragraph 3.e.2.g.

c. (S//REL) <u>Transitioning Security Responsibilities to the ISF</u>. Securing the population is the priority. Transitioning security responsibilities to the Iraqis occurs in a deliberate fashion and is based on local conditions. CF encourage and support the gradual shift to Iraqi-led and then more independent Iraqi operations, building to the assumption of security responsibilities by civil authorities under provincial Iraqi control (PIC). However, MNC-I will avoid a "rush to failure" that places Iraqis in control of local or provincial security before they are ready. Transition is a desirable goal that comes with risks in any locale, but CF units should not accept the risks associated with a premature transition simply on the assumption that transition itself will generate stability.

(1). (S//REL) PIC. PIC remains a significant milestone on the path to security self-reliance. Its purpose is to complete the process of gradually transferring *primary* security responsibility in a province from MNC-I to Iraqi civil authorities. PIC involves the governor, as the senior civil authority in a province, assuming primary responsibility for security within his province. A recommendation for granting PIC status to a province is based on the following general conditions: the security threat level; the capability of the ISF (including both the IP and IA); the level of proficiency of provincial civilian governance (pertaining specifically to security-related issues); and the ability of CF to maintain an appropriate "overwatch" stance in the province following transition. This is not an absolute or total transition but one characterized by nuances determined in part by the specific security conditions that exist in the province at the time. At a minimum, CF will support PRT operations and continue to engage political, security, community, and tribal leaders to monitor the progress of governance and economic development in the province. The relationship between CF, ISF, and the provincial civil authorities is formally established in the PIC memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the provincial governor and the respective MND/F commander. For details on the Provincial Security Transition Assessment and the PIC process, see Appendix 17, Annex C.

(2). (S//REL) Impact of "Operational Commands" on PIC. Organizations like the Baghdad Operational Command (BOC) may enhance the command and control of security forces in an area, but they also complicate the transition to PIC. For example, the BOC will probably retain responsibility for security in the city of Baghdad long after the governor is ready to assume control of ISF activity in the province. That is, the province may meet the criteria required for transfer to civil control, yet the transfer in these circumstances would involve much more than the hand-off of security responsibilities from MNC-I to the governor. The situation may become one where the Iraqis themselves hinder progress toward PIC by needlessly prolonging the existence of command arrangements established when the local security threat was much higher. Similar challenges will likely arise in other provinces where GOI leaders are contemplating the establishment of operational commands, including Anbar, Diyala, and Karbala. The corps has not yet developed a solution for dealing with the specifics of these challenges. Nonetheless, *PIC remains the goal*. When a province has achieved the conditions for PIC, the Coalition will take steps to persuade Iraqi leaders to transfer security responsibilities from military commanders to the provincial governor and to sustain this transfer through continued ministerial support. The transition should be a gradual one,

proceeding deliberately by locale and perhaps tied closely to a phased withdrawal of IA units from urban areas as proven IP continue to maintain law and order.

(3). (S//REL) Overwatch. To facilitate transition, CF adopt support relationships with the ISF that allow Iraqi units to assume increasing levels of responsibility for security as they become more capable over time. The overall capacity of ISF units in a given area, relative to the threat they face, is the principal factor that determines CF overwatch posture. Because of this, a CF BCT could potentially be in more than one posture, especially if its operational environment is fairly large and contains several Iraqi units.

(a). (S//REL) Tactical Overwatch. Generally, CF provide tactical overwatch for ISF units that are capable of taking the lead in operations within their assigned AOs. CF will posture tactical response forces in close proximity and within quick response times for ISF units. The purpose of these forces is to: prevent the defeat of ISF units; reestablish local security control in situations that exceed ISF capability; and provide support to CF transition teams. The authority of CF to intervene in tactical overwatch is held at MND/F level. CF provide ISF units with enablers and CSS when emergency intervention is required to maintain their operating effectiveness. This support includes EOD, joint fires, ISR, and MEDEVAC. CF continue to meet the bulk of route clearance requirements. CF progressively reduce the provision of life support and other CSS to the ISF as Iraqi logistical force elements develop the capacity to sustain and support ISF independent operations. The characteristics of tactical overwatch are consistent with the conditions in which enhanced transition teams would be employed.

(b). (S//REL) Operational Overwatch. CF provide operational overwatch for ISF units that are capable of independently planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In general, CF provide operational overwatch to ISF formations that are assigned within provinces that have achieved PIC. During operational overwatch, CF will maintain forces capable of providing reaction forces with relatively longer response times to intervene in situations that exceed ISF capability and endanger civil security control at provincial level. The authority to intervene with operational overwatch forces is held at MNC-I in provinces that have not yet achieved PIC status and at MNF-I (with GOI coordination) for PIC provinces. CF are also postured to provide emergency CSS, which is limited to the support required to prevent the

collapse of operational effectiveness. CF provide route clearance of theater-wide MSRs only. CF can establish coordinated temporary supply routes, or maneuver routes, through ISF-controlled AOs for the purpose of access and egress from Coalition operating bases to predetermined combined operating areas. CF also retain the right to employ joint fires in self-defense as well as freedom of movement to conduct military operations within AOs assigned to ISF units for the purpose of saving CF lives, executing in extremis rescue, and reinforcing CF. The characteristics of operational overwatch are consistent with the conditions in which advisory/assistance brigades and strike BCTs would be employed.

(c). (S//REL) Strategic Overwatch. CF provide strategic overwatch for ISF units that are in full control of security, to include COIN and counter-terrorism operations, routine policing duties, and border security tasks. Areas in strategic overwatch are stable and under an Iraqi civil authority that has the capacity to sustain and, if necessary, restore that stability. During strategic overwatch, CF maintain forces in key locations away from major population centers in order to deter external threats to Iraq, support counter-terrorism operations, and reduce malign external influences through actions coordinated with the GOI. The Coalition will intervene only at the request of the GOI – with the details of this supporting arrangement delineated in bilateral or multilateral agreements. The level at which Coalition authority to intervene with strategic overwatch forces resides has not been determined. Tentatively and at a minimum, authority will reside with MNF-I. CF can establish coordinated temporary supply routes, or maneuver routes, through ISF-controlled AOs for the purpose of access and egress from Coalition operating bases to predetermined combined operating areas. CF also retain the right to employ joint fires in self-defense as well as freedom of movement to conduct military operations within AOs assigned to ISF units for the purpose of saving CF lives, executing in extremis rescue, and reinforcing CF.

3. (S//REL) LOO 3 – Legitimate, Capable GOI. Sustainable security and progress toward self-reliance is not possible without substantial improvements in governmental capacity and legitimacy. Through its actions along this LOO, MNC-I supports a broader Coalition effort. At the local level, BCTs and PRTs work in combination to bring about good governance, economic development, and improvements in essential services. At the operational level, MNC-I conducts engagement to "link" the national GOI

with the provinces and municipalities in order to enhance its legitimacy. A key component of these efforts is reducing sectarian behavior at all levels of the GOI. One dimension involves promoting cooperative, non-sectarian behavior, as well as competence, in Iraqi officials in local and provincial government. Conversely, another dimension includes identifying officials who adhere to sectarian agendas and then taking steps – in conjunction with the GOI where practical – to remove them from positions of power and influence.

a. (S//REL) Governance. MNC-I efforts to improve governance aim to make the Iraqi government more legitimate and capable by facilitating the establishment of representative local and provincial governments, enhancing government capacity, and fostering conditions that shape perceptions of the GOI as pursuing a national rather than sectarian agenda. Through a partnership of Paired PRTs, Embedded PRTs, BCTs, and other agencies, MNC-I will build and strengthen provincial and municipal linkages, support provincial capacity development, enhance GOI budget execution in provinces and municipalities, develop Rule-of-Law assistance in local and provincial governments, and collaborate with UNAMI and the GOI to conduct transparent and legitimate elections. See Appendix 1 and 2, Annex G.

b. (S//REL) Rule-of-Law. Rule-of-Law is a fundamental principle of governance under which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws which are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated. The laws must be consistent in both substance and enforcement with international human rights standards and norms. Establishing public confidence in the Rule-of-Law will be accomplished by providing support and technical expertise to the Iraqi government at the local and provincial levels. MNC-I and subordinate units will coordinate and manage programs/initiatives to assist the GOI in reforming its legal and judicial systems and building the capacity of Iraqi legal professionals and institutions to administer fair, efficient, and effective justice. These programs/initiatives will include the establishment of *Rule of Law Safe Zones* in key cities outside of Baghdad to permit Iraqi investigative judges and trial judges to dispose of their cases in a secure environment. MSCs will provide a bi-monthly plan indicating all conducted and projected operations or programs implemented for the purpose of building the capacity of Rule-of-Law through direct contact and relationship with the provincial and local judicial systems. See Appendix 1, Annex G.

c. (S//REL) Reconstruction. MNC-I's reconstruction focus is on providing essential services, including power generation and distribution, a clean and steady source of potable water, and efficient, effective disposal and

treatment of sewer waste. Communications and economic development are heavily dependent on reliable, steady electrical generation and secure distribution lines. Agriculture and manufacturing require sufficient quantity of clean water, delivered on demand. To improve the health and well-being of Iraq's residents, sewage systems must move waste to functioning treatment plants. MNC-I uses Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) as the primary tool to repair, complete, and increase capacity of essential services in Iraq. Working in conjunction with the GOI, GRD, and PRTs, the corps will fund near-term reconstruction projects that stabilize the Baghdad 400kV distribution system; continue to develop sewer, water, and electric systems – based on initial capacity and demand assessments; and set conditions for future economic growth. As systems are repaired, maintained and/or improved in Baghdad, we will transition the responsibility for maintenance and systems planning to the GOI, and assist with the completion of the Karkh sewer line main trunk. As basic services are restored to Baghdad, we will begin to build and increase capacity in the remaining strategic cities. Priority of reconstruction effort is to Baghdad, but we must also consider *secure areas* where the *populace and local Iraqi officials demonstrate cooperative behavior*. MNC-I must target its reconstruction assistance based on these criteria. Priority of support is to economic development. The desired end state is a GOI capable of providing consistent, adequate essential services to urban areas and maintaining strategic infrastructure in order to support and sustain long term economic growth. See Annex V.

d. (S//REL) Economic Development. Historically, Iraq's economy has been dominated by the petroleum sector, which provided about 95% of foreign exchange earnings. The oil industry has been in a state of neglect since 1990, suffering from a lack of infrastructure development and maintenance. Illicit oil activities such as pipeline interdiction, crude oil and refined fuel product theft, and corruption continue to have detrimental effects on Iraq's economy. These activities lead to a direct loss of Iraqi revenue (from crude exports and from the sale of refined fuel products to the populace), which limits resources the GOI might otherwise be able to allocate to reconstruction efforts. Illicit activity also reduces public and foreign investor confidence in the GOI. Iraq's economy will grow if, and only if, revenue from the petroleum sector can be restored to pre-1990 levels – *and* if the GOI can subsequently begin to execute their budget efficiently, elicit consumer confidence, and produce job growth. In order to sustain a viable economic foundation for Iraq, MNC-I must focus heavily on the development of those industries and natural resources where Iraq has a clear competitive advantage. These are areas where products and/or services produce revenue (returning money to the Iraqi economy rather than just moving dinars back and forth). A focus on the banking structure lays a

foundation for moving away from simple cash exchange to electronic or otherwise documented exchange, which will slow the growth of fraud and limit the profitability of black market activities. MNC-I will manage programs that mass efforts on five key economic functions: banking, job creation, secure commercial zones, industrial revitalization (focusing especially on the exploitation of fossil fuels), and agri-business. Progress in these focus areas will provide a foundation for long-term economic growth, combined with increased employment opportunities in the near term. See Appendix 3, Annex G.

e. (S//REL) Strategic Infrastructure Security. The sale of unlawfully acquired petroleum products and associated illegal activities provides a key revenue line for AQI, Sunni insurgents, and criminal elements present at all levels of Iraqi society. MNC-I executes a comprehensive approach to infrastructure security, which blocks funding for illegal activities by interdiction of financial transfers; denies linear infrastructure to both AQI, Sunni insurgents, and criminal elements; and provides the fair, equitable, and legal distribution of petroleum products to the Iraqi people. ISF will conduct operations in conjunction with CF in a mentoring and supporting role. See Appendix 11, Annex C.

4. (S//REL) Effective Communications. Effective Communications is integrated into all LOOs. Every action undertaken within Iraq, as a function of the other LOOs, will have an effect on Iraqi perceptions. Therefore, it is imperative that those effects are taken into consideration in all planning efforts. Key elements of Effective Communications are face-to-face engagements with key and local leaders, interaction with local media, and information operations (IO). Focus areas for the Effective Communications LOO are decreasing sectarian violence, weakening AQI, encouraging reconciliation, and promoting the GOI and ISF – particularly non-sectarian behavior in those institutions. Public Affairs will maintain their adherence to providing only true and accurate information while supporting the objectives of the command. This will entail highlighting GOI successes and coordinating for local media to cover major events and operations when possible. Media operations – including senior leader major market, key leader medium market, and Service Member small market engagements – all contribute to the Effective Communications LOO. The overarching MNC-I Public Affairs guidance to subordinate units is intended to provide commanders wide latitude. MNC-I will avoid overly prescriptive messaging and allow commanders and their subordinates to use their good judgment as they focus on talking about the mission, staying in their respective lanes, and respecting operational security. The MNC-I Reconciliation and Engagements Cell (REC) will use the targeting process to identify those Iraqi leaders (political, social, tribal, religious, business, etc.) who hold sway over key sectors of the populace and, because of this, can influence perceptions and, ultimately, actions. The REC will develop an

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MNC-I key leader engagement strategy and coordinate engagements with selected Iraqi leaders, synchronizing MNC-I's themes and talking points as part of their efforts. See Appendix 6, Annex C, for detailed guidance on engagement. The MNC-I IO cell has the lead in the Effective Communications LOO and will seek to exploit the successes of the ISF and GOI across all LOOs to achieve MNC-I Objectives. Additionally, MNC-I will use the core, supporting, and related elements of IO and other forms of effective communications to mitigate negative events in Iraq that have potential propaganda value. IO will focus efforts on: disrupting sectarian violence, with priority to Baghdad, the nine key cities, and then the rest of Iraq; disrupting the effectiveness of AQI; degrading IED networks and their ability to conduct effective attacks; promoting the credibility of the GOI while building trust and confidence in economic development and improved basic services; and disrupting Iranian activities (lethal and non-lethal) in Iraq and [1.4b, 1.4d] to surrogate networks in Iraq. See Appendix 7, Annex C for the IO concept of support.

(b) (S//REL) Operational Objectives and Conditions.

1. (S//REL) Objective 1 – Population secured, violence reduced, with a priority to Baghdad, then the nine strategic cities and the rest of Iraq.

   a. (U) Near-Term Conditions.

      (1). (S//REL) Sectarian murders significantly reduced in Baghdad security districts; violence in other key cities at an acceptable level.
      (2). (S//REL) Displacement from Baghdad halted; those previously displaced begin to return voluntarily.
      (3). (S//REL) AQI high-profile attacks on civilians significantly reduced.
      (4). (S//REL) Kurdish region maintains current level of stability.
      (5). (S//REL) Shia-on-Shia violence in the southern provinces localized and controlled by the ISF.

   b. (U) End State Conditions.

      (1). (S//REL) Sectarian murders significantly reduced in Baghdad security districts and the strategic cities.
      (2). (S//REL) Violent crime reduced to a level manageable by the Iraqi Police (IP).
      (3). (S//REL) Kirkuk stable; Article 140 issue resolved.
      (4). (S//REL) Balance of power among Shia factions achieved; Shia factions continue to vie for power largely through non-violent means.
      (5). (S//REL) No expansion of Turkish presence in the Kurdish region.

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2. (S//REL) Objective 2 – Violent enemy actors defeated, neutralized, or disrupted.

   a. (U) Near-Term Conditions.

      (1). (S//REL) Majority of Iraqi population rejects extremist groups.
      (2). (S//REL) No AQI and Sunni extremist sanctuaries in Baghdad and the Belts.
      (3). (S//REL) Sunnis reject AQI and begin to actively support ISF.
      (4). (S//REL) GOI involvement in a reconciliation process that provides a means for factions to satisfy their interests through non-violent means.
      (5). (S//REL) Negotiations with key insurgent groups ongoing, with some local ceasefires brokered.
      (6). (S//REL) Militia influence diminished and moving toward reconciliation.
      (7). (S//REL) CF and ISF freedom of movement throughout Iraq largely unimpeded.

   b. (U) End State Conditions.

      (1). (S//REL) AQI and extremists isolated from external support and rejected by Iraqi populace.
      (2). (S//REL) Sunni insurgents reconciled with GOI or defeated.
      (3). (S//REL) Militias demobilized and well on the way to reintegrating.

3. (S//REL) Objective 3 – Security of Iraq's borders improved.

   a. (U) Near-Term Conditions.

      (1). (S//REL) Improved POE procedures in place.
      (2). (S//REL) Increased CF presence at POEs (primarily Border Transition Teams).

   b. (U) End State Conditions.

      (1). (S//REL) Rigorous and effective inspection regime established at POEs.
      (2).

                            1.4b, 1.4d

4. (S//REL) Objective 4 – ISF capability enhanced; sectarian behavior in the ISF reduced.

   a. (U) Near-Term Conditions.

  (1). (S//REL) Sunni and Shia civilians in Baghdad and the Belts consider ISF reliable and capable of providing security.

  (2). (S//REL) Key ISF C2 in place and functioning (JHQ, IGFC, BOC, Anbar and Diyala "BOC equivalents").

  (3). (S//REL) IA units possess capability to lead COIN operations ICW IP, NP (National Police), and CF (a capability sustainable over time).

  (4). (S//REL) IP and NP capable of maintaining domestic order with IA support (a capability sustainable over time).

  (5). (S//REL) ISF capability to secure key infrastructure improving.

  (6). (S//REL) DBE forces not yet capable of securing border areas but improving with IA and CF support.

  (7). (S//REL) POE forces capable of conducting POE procedures with CF support.

 b. (U) End State Conditions.

  (1). (S//REL) Iraqi populace considers the ISF reliable and capable of providing security; ISF viewed as dominant security force.

  (2). (S//REL) IP in the lead, maintaining order in population centers; NP in support as required.

  (3). (S//REL) IA in garrison, conducting independent COIN ops or supporting border security ops as required.

  (4). (S//REL) ISF securing key strategic infrastructure.

  (5). (S//REL) DBE forces securing border areas with IA support.

  (6). (S//REL) POE forces implementing effective POE procedures.

  (7). (S//REL) ISF self-sustaining, with the exception of support provided through normal security assistance programs.

5. (S//REL) Objective 5 – Security responsibilities transitioned to Iraqis.

 a. (U) Near-Term Conditions.

  (1). (S//REL) Provincial Joint Coordination Centers (PJCC) in place and functional.

  (2). (S//REL) All planned Joint Security Stations fully manned and functioning under ISF lead.

  (3). (S//REL) CF in tactical overwatch in Baghdad and the Belts, Anbar, and Salah ad Din, Tamim, and Diyala.

  (4). (S//REL) CF in operational overwatch in Kurdish region, Ninewa, portions of Salah ad Din, and the southern provinces.

 b. (U) End State Conditions.

  (1). (S//REL) PJCCs in place and functional.

(2). (S//REL) CF in strategic overwatch, positioned in a limited number of bases in Iraq but away from major population centers.

(3). (S//REL) Coalition-run Office of Security Cooperation with an advisory component working with GOI.

6. (S//REL) Objective 6 – Representative local and provincial governments established and functioning.

    a. (U) Near-Term Conditions.

        (1). (S//REL) Provincial Powers and Provincial Elections laws passed.

        (2). (S//REL) Date for provincial elections announced.

        (3). (S//REL) All provincial financial accounts open; GOI distributing funds; and provinces executing budgets.

        (4). (S//REL) Anbar provincial council meeting in Ramadi.

    b. (U) End State Conditions.

        (1). (S//REL) Provincial elections have occurred.

        (2). (S//REL) Iraqi provincial control established and sustained throughout Iraq.

7. (S//REL) Objective 7 – GOI capacity enhanced to provide essential services and strategic infrastructure maintenance and security.

    a. (U) Near-Term Conditions.

        (1). (S//REL) Iraqis perceive improvements in their quality of life and attribute those improvements to the GOI.

        (2). (S//REL) GOI provides essential services on an equitable, though inconsistent, basis to Iraqis in Baghdad and the Belts.

        (3). (S//REL) Reduction in effectiveness of attacks on energy infrastructure.

    b. (U) End State Conditions.

        (1). (S//REL) GOI provides consistent, adequate essential services to Iraqis.

        (2). (S//REL) Refined hydrocarbon products supply Iraqis with adequate levels of fuel to meet basic needs and generate revenues on par with existing infrastructure's potential.

        (3). (S//REL) Existing power-generation infrastructure provides electricity to Baghdad and strategic cities in amounts sufficient to meet basic needs and sustain small businesses and industry.

        (4). (S//REL) GOI revenues able to support reconstruction and long-term development.

8. (S//REL) Objective 8 – GOI perceived as representative and legitimate, pursuing national rather than sectarian goals.

   a. (U) Near-Term Conditions.

      (1). (S//REL) A majority of Sunnis accepts the political process as legitimate and chooses it as the means to promote Sunni interests/objectives.

      (2). (S//REL) The GOI continues to develop into a more representative, inclusive governing body.

      (3). (S//REL) KRG views its status as a semi-autonomous region of Iraq as the best means to preserve Kurdish interests in the near term.

      (4). (S//REL) Rule-of-Law Complex established and functioning; components of the Rule-of-Law system in provinces outside of Baghdad in place and improving.

      (5). (S//REL) Sectarian behavior and influence in GOI ministries markedly reduced.

      (6). (S//REL) GOI continues to make progress toward key legislation and components of reconciliation, including de-Baathification reform, constitutional review, and amnesty policy.

      (7). (S//REL) Provinces continue to receive funding from national government on an equitable basis.

      (8). (S//REL) Regional and international audiences view reconciliation as a GOI-driven process.

   b. (U) End State Conditions.

      (1). (S//REL) Representative, inclusive GOI viewed as legitimate by the Iraqi people.

      (2). (S//REL) Key components of national reconciliation implemented.

      (3). (S//REL) Rule-of-Law system established and functioning; provincial systems in place for detention, trial, and incarceration operate IAW Iraq's constitution.

9. (S//REL) Objective 9 – Foundation for self-sustaining economic growth established.

   a. (U) Near-Term Conditions.

      (1). (S//REL) Opportunities for employment increasing, primarily in Baghdad.

      (2). (S//REL) Hydrocarbon law and Foreign Investment law passed.

      (3). (S//REL) Consumer confidence improved through establishment of secure commercial zones.

(4). (S//REL) Vocational training institutions providing labor to meet the demands of a growing economy.

(5). (S//REL) All Iraqis have access to banking.

b. (U) End State Conditions.

(1). (S//REL) Opportunities for employment in Baghdad and strategic cities compare favorably to those in urban areas of other regional states.

(2). (S//REL) Financial systems conducive to growth of a free market in place and supported by GOI policies.

(3). (S//REL) Select state-owned enterprises revitalized; growth of private sector underway.

(4). (S//REL) Vocational training and higher education institutions providing labor to meet demands of a growing economy.

(c) (S//REL) Phasing. There are five phases of the campaign. The phasing construct acknowledges the diverse conditions existing in different AOs. It provides a framework for characterizing the relationship between CF and the Iraqi forces sharing their operational environment, as well as the security conditions that help to define that relationship. These factors vary by province and even locale, and thus *AOs will progress through phases at different rates*. Phase progression is not based on a distinct point in time or driven by a single event. Rather, a shift from one phase to the next is gradual. Phases are described below in terms of the key actions that CF take by phase and the security conditions marking the conclusion of each phase. MNC-I integrates actions pertaining to all of the LOOs into each phase.

•This is a five-phased campaign. Although the campaign is phased, operations do not transition from phase to phase in a linear fashion; rather, areas transition from phase to phase based upon conditions being met at local and provincial levels.

•These phases will progress at different rates at different times throughout Iraq

End of 2007

The critical period

Phase 5 - Strategic Overwatch
Phase 5 - Strategic Overwatch
•Iraqi civil authorities have full responsibility for security
•Transition all LOOs from Operational to Strategic Overwatch

Phase 4 - Operational Overwatch
Phase 4 - Operational Overwatch
•Independent ISF operations
•ISF taking responsibility for all security functions; CF consolidation outside of urban areas

Phase 3 - Tactical Overwatch
Phase 3 - Tactical Overwatch
•Sustained security and ISF in the lead
•Sustain improved security and continue transition of security responsibilities

Phase 2 - Clear, Control, Retain
Phase 2 - Clear, Control, Retain
•Decisive MNC-I phase with three sub-phases (the BSP is the main effort)
•Establish security and gain the confidence of the Iraqi people
•Already underway, and lasts until Baghdad and the Baghdad belts are secure

Phase 1 - Setting Key Conditions
Phase 1 - Setting Key Conditions
•Continual effort to connect national GOI to provinces and districts
•Monitoring progress of key legislation, reducing sectarian behavior, facilitating reconciliation
•Already under way, lasts throughout much of the campaign

Multiple actors competing for the support of the Iraqi Populaiton

Improved Level of **Stability**

Iraq that is secure and self-reliant

Current Situation

Near-Term

End State

Figure 2, (S//REL) *MNC-I Campaign Phases*

1. (S//REL) Phase 1 – Setting Key Conditions. Phase 1 is underway and lasts throughout much of the campaign. It involves MNC-I's continual effort to connect the national GOI to the provinces and districts so that GOI legitimacy is enhanced in the eyes of Iraqis. MNC-I helps to improve local and provincial governance while working as part of a broader Coalition endeavor to persuade and encourage the central government and ministries to address critical concerns raised by the provinces in a responsive manner. This includes monitoring the progress of important legislation and taking actions to reduce sectarian behavior, particularly in Iraqi security institutions. Another key action lasting the duration of the campaign is facilitating reconciliation to set conditions for local ceasefires that will expand and eventually culminate with a broad negotiated settlement.

2. (S//REL) Phase 2 – Clear, Control, Retain. The purpose of Phase 2 is to establish security for the population in areas marked by high levels of ethno-sectarian violence. Its name describes the approach CF follow as they establish, maintain, and improve security in conjunction with the ISF, particularly (but not exclusively) in Baghdad. Clear, control, and retain are each sub-phases that classify an area in terms of the primary tactical task

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that CF and ISF perform there. Starting with "clear," operations in a designated area progress in a deliberate fashion to the "control" and, later, "retain" stages. This progression coincides with noticeable improvements in the local security situation. Iraqi-led operations increase in frequency throughout the clear, control, retain sub-phases, but continuous CF presence among the population remains in place throughout all of Phase 2. CF *partner* with ISF units in this phase as both conduct combined, [1.4c] [1.4c] against AQI, Sunni insurgents, and militias that attack security forces or intimidate segments of the population. This offensive effort is coupled with the implementation of population control measures (see Appendix 1, Annex C) and sustained presence through JSSs and COPs. Improving security throughout this phase is a deliberate process, with priority given to the retention and control of cleared areas. CF synchronize improvements in local security with the initiation or expansion of economic development and efforts to enhance government capacity, with Coalition assistance focused on areas where officials demonstrate non-sectarian behavior. Iraqis in "control" and "retain" areas should see and sense real change for the better in their daily lives. Toward the end of the "retain" sub-phase, CF will begin to adjust their posture to tactical overwatch, executing this shift gradually and by area. Phase 2 ends *in a given area* when: high-profile attacks and sectarian murders are significantly reduced; forced population displacement is halted; AQI and Sunni extremist sanctuaries are eliminated; militia influence is diminished; local ISF are capable of leading COIN operations; all planned JSSs are fully manned and functioning under ISF lead; and CF have transitioned to tactical overwatch.

3. (S//REL) Phase 3 – Tactical Overwatch. The purpose of Phase 3 is to sustain an improved level of security as local ISF make progress from *leading* COIN operations to conducting *independent* operations. CF begin this phase in tactical overwatch (see page 21). Efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue – but under Iraqi-lead. Economic development initiatives and projects to improve infrastructure and essential services increase in scale and scope, given conditions of sustained security and growing GOI capacity. The re-posturing that began in Phase 2 continues as CF shift gradually and deliberately to operational overwatch in areas where the overall trends toward improving security and increasing ISF capability persist. This shift in CF posture will take the form of a progressive "thinning of the line" in unit sectors – not the abrupt removal of whole battalions from their battlespace. This kind of re-posturing allows routine CF interaction with the populace to diminish as the ISF assume more and more responsibility for COIN operations in a controlled fashion. The tight bonds of CF-ISF partnership fade with the reduction of direct CF involvement. However, support to the ISF continues through the employment of transition teams that advise and assist Iraqi units and provide access to enablers IAW tactical overwatch guidelines. Ground commanders allocate teams with the goal of providing "24/7" coverage of ISF units. In

the likely case where the number of teams makes this impossible, commanders optimize coverage, giving priority to ISF units suspected of sectarian behavior, newly-formed units or those with unproven performance in combat, and units with primarily urban operational environments. Optimizing transition team coverage in this phase may involve developing a rotational scheme depending on the number and status of ISF units in the area. Commanders also take steps to mitigate the risks associated with providing transition team coverage in operational environments characterized by a reduced CF presence. Such mitigation might take the form of maintaining QRFs or enhancing transition teams in a way that allows them to secure themselves. Although their presence among the population is less pervasive, CF still maintain time-sensitive targeting forces at the BCT level in order to conduct strike operations against high-value individuals and extremist networks. Phase 3 ends *in a given area* when: local ISF are able to sustain security, having accepted control of the operational environment from CF; Iraqi civilians consider the ISF reliable and capable of providing security, viewing them as the dominant security forces; local IA units are able to conduct independent COIN operations; and CF have transitioned to operational overwatch.

4. (S//REL) Phase 4 – Operational Overwatch. The purpose of Phase 4 is to sustain independent Iraqi operations while expanding ISF capacity to take responsibility for all security functions in a given area. CF begin this phase in operational overwatch (see page 21). Efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue primarily under ISF control, with the IP assuming greater responsibility for maintaining domestic order in population centers. In conjunction with growing IP-lead, IA units increasingly take on more of a counter-terrorism role, conduct COIN operations in less populated areas to deny extremist group sanctuary, secure strategic infrastructure, and reinforce the DBE where required. Key to this phase is making progress toward the completion of a functioning logistical support system that allows the ISF to become self-sustaining. The continuing transition of security responsibilities accompanies a further reduction in CF interaction with the populace and a noticeable decline in CF presence as forces consolidate on major FOBs. Support to the ISF continues – but on a less frequent and less extensive basis, with CF providing limited access to enablers IAW operational overwatch guidelines. Given a reduction in CF in the area and their consolidation, ground commanders provide forces to advise and assist on a rotational basis, though they retain flexibility to focus coverage where required. With CF more dispersed, commanders maintain the ability to provide adequate and responsive security to PRTs and advisory/assistance teams. Over time though, even these teams are gradually withdrawn as CF in the ITO assume strategic overwatch and the limited mission set that posture entails. In addition to supporting local ISF as they complete their assumption of full security responsibilities, CF continue to conduct strike operations against high-value

individuals and extremist networks. Phase 4 ends *in a given area* when: local ISF continue to sustain security; IP are in the lead, maintaining order in population centers with the NP in support; IA units consistently conduct independent COIN operations and secure strategic infrastructure; the DBE conducts relatively effective border security operations, with the IA in support; and CF have transitioned to strategic overwatch.

5. (S//REL) Phase 5 – Strategic Overwatch. The purpose of Phase 5 is to transition to the end state of self-reliance along all LOOs in a given area. Recognizing that an area or province cannot itself become "self-reliant," Phase 5 also involves a larger effort on the part of GOI to connect local and provincial progress toward the end state with similar progress on a national scale. CF begin this phase in strategic overwatch (see page 20). Iraqi civil authorities have full responsibility for security in their areas and exercise control over local ISF that are able to protect the population and neutralize internal threats through independent operations. Amid this sustained stability, CF continue to gradually reduce force levels until reaching a point consistent with a predetermined security arrangement with the GOI. This consists of one U.S. BCT in theater reserve in Kuwait, plus four U.S. BCTs in consolidated operating bases dispersed in critical logistical hubs and strategic overwatch positions throughout Iraq: one in the north in either Irbil or Q-West; one in the west in Al Asad; one in central Iraq in Anaconda; and one in either Camp Delta or Tallil. In addition, one Coalition brigade-sized force will be positioned vicinity Basra Air Station. A CF headquarters element remains in Victory Base Complex. In Phase 5, CF no longer provide dedicated support to the ISF. Their missions are limited to self-security, counter-terrorism operations in coordination with and at the request of the GOI, and possible intervention in the event of strategic-level crises. CF maintain relationships with the ISF through periodic joint and combined exchange training and staff assistance visits to key command and control nodes, such as JHQ, IGFC, IA division headquarters, ports of entry, and the security ministries. This assistance is coordinated with the efforts of an Office of Security Cooperation, working under the auspices of USM-I and growing in capacity. CF presence in Iraq deters malign external actors while assuring U.S. allies in the region. Positioning is designed to alleviate Turkey's concerns over Kurdish designs regarding autonomy, the anxieties of Arab states over the spread of [1.4b, 1.4d] and the GOI's fear of AQI and [1.4b, 1.4d] Through their presence, CF also contribute to political stability in Iraq by encouraging reconciled internal actors to adhere to negotiated settlements. Phase 5 concludes with the attainment of the campaign end state: Iraq is self-reliant and politically stable with the institutions and resources it needs to govern justly, secure from internal and external threats, inaccessible as a safe haven for terrorists, and integrated into the international community as an engine for regional economic growth.

(d) (S//REL) Concept for Future Force Posture. From February to June 2007, the "plus-up" gradually increased the number of U.S. BCTs in the ITO from fifteen to twenty. MNC-I committed these additional forces to Baghdad and the Belts in order to protect the population and interdict accelerants of sectarian violence. In this manner, the Coalition supported the reinvigoration of the GOI's Baghdad Security Plan without having to reduce CF presence in other parts of the country, thus renewing efforts to secure the people of Iraq's capital without jeopardizing progress made elsewhere. The "plus-up" allowed CF to continue with the transition of security responsibilities to the Iraqis in areas where this was appropriate, particularly in MND-SE and in parts of MND-N. It also permitted MNF-W to exploit advances made against AQI. As sustained CF and ISF pressure in Baghdad and the Belts continues in the coming months, threat groups will likely respond by shifting the focus of their operations to other locations (the escalation of violence in Diyala Province in the early months of the "plus-up" serves as a case in point). Maintaining sufficient forces in key areas outside of Baghdad provides MNC-I with the flexibility to address these shifts in enemy patterns and behavior. This remains valid as the Coalition begins a conditions-based reduction in the number of U.S. BCTs.

1. (S//REL) Reduction of U.S. BCTs from Twenty to Fifteen. When MNC-I achieves its near-term conditions, it may undertake a deliberate reduction in force. This reduction will proceed at a rate not to exceed one BCT per month and will generally be implemented through an off-ramping of the "plus-up" BCTs without backfill. As a result, the preponderance of the reduction will occur in Baghdad, where MNC-I will have focused its efforts for the better part of a year to improve stability. The corps will preserve the success achieved in the capital with a continued but lessened presence in the Baghdad Security Districts and by maintaining a steady level of force in the Belts (to include western Diyala Province). Just as the scheme of reduction assumes success in Baghdad, it does so in Anbar Province as well. In conjunction with decreasing overall force levels, the corps will posture itself for an enduring security arrangement by retaining bases in key locations. Additionally, MNC-I will facilitate the ongoing transition with ISF by maintaining adequate overwatch forces in range of most strategic cities and will increase the amount of its forces committed to improving border security.

   a. (S//REL) CJSOTF-AP. While conventional units decrease in number, CJSOTF-AP maintains its current strength and mission set: engagement with tribal and community leaders, developing ISOF capability, FID with key ISF units, and disrupting extremist networks.

   b. (S//REL) Adjustment of MND Boundaries. In the process of downsizing from twenty to fifteen U.S. BCTs, the corps will adjust division boundaries as the number of U.S. MND headquarters shifts from four to three. Prior to this event and in the summer or fall of 2007,

MND-CS will consolidate its forces in Qadisiyah as MND-C expands its AO to encompass all of Wasit Province. In late 2007, MND-C will absorb Qadisiyah Province into its operational environment, and the MND-CS headquarters will redeploy without backfill. Beginning in early 2008, MND-B will gradually expand its operational environment as it assumes control of designated areas from MND-C (perhaps by province). The MND-C headquarters will redeploy without backfill in June 2008.

c. (S//REL) Anticipated Number of U.S. BCTs per Division AO. MNC-I will maintain fifteen U.S. BCTs for a number of months. This "plateau" period will enable the corps to gauge the impact of the force reduction on the overall security situation and allow leaders to validate the performance of the ISF prior to the next "reduction set." A fifteen U.S. BCT set will likely consist of:

(1). (S//REL) MND-B – 2 IBCTs and 1 HBCT in the Baghdad Security Districts; 1 SBCT as a Strike Force on the outskirts of Baghdad; 1 IBCT and 1 HBCT in the Southern Belt; 1 HBCT in Camp Delta focused on Iraq's border area.

(2). (S//REL) MND-N – 1 HBCT and 1 SBCT in the Northern Belt and Diyala Province; 1 IBCT in Salah ad Din; 1 IBCT vicinity Kirkuk; 1 HBCT vicinity Tall Afar-Mosul, with a probable focus on Iraq's border area.

(3). (S//REL) MNF-W – 2 IBCTs in the Euphrates River Valley – 1 vicinity Al Asad and 1 between Ramadi and Falluja.

(4). (S//REL) Theater Security – 1 IBCT.

Figure 3. (S//REL) Fifteen U.S. BCT Set

2. (S//REL) Reduction of U.S. BCTs from Fifteen to Ten. The reduction from fifteen to ten U.S. BCTs will entail a significant shift CF posture because it will likely end with the entire country in Operational Overwatch (and perhaps portions in Strategic Overwatch). This reduction will occur at a rate of one BCT per month – with "plateaus" upon reaching twelve and then ten BCTs in order to validate ISF capability and the effectiveness of Iraqi provincial control in light of decreased CF levels. This "reduction set" will include a substantial number of FOB closures as BCTs consolidate on fewer major bases, posturing for a continued reduction and an enduring security arrangement with Iraq. A ten U.S. BCT set will likely consist of four division AOs containing a mix of Strike BCTs and Advisory/Assistance Brigades. This force array will allow Strike BCTs to provide security and remain postured for rapid, decisive intervention without disrupting the efforts of Advisory/Assistance Brigades as they continue to focus on the mission of supporting the ISF in their assigned AOs.

a. (S//REL) MND-B – 1 Strike BCT and 2 Advisory/Assistance Brigades, with the latter focused on the city of Baghdad and the Southern Belt.

b. (S//REL) MND-N – 2 Strike BCTs and 2 Advisory/Assistance Brigades, with one of each positioned between Mosul and Samarra and one of each positioned to support the Northern Belt and Diyala Province.

c. (S//REL) MNF-W – 1 Strike BCT and 1 Advisory/Assistance Brigade.

d. (S//REL) MND-SE – 1 Coalition brigade performing the functions of an Advisory/Assistance Brigade.

e. (S//REL) Theater Security – 1 Strike BCT.

f. (S//REL) CJSOTF-AP – In conjunction with diminishing conventional force levels, CJSOTF-AP increases in importance as an economy-of-force effort, maintaining its current strength and mission set (see above). However, the task force is increasingly selective regarding the types of Iraqi units with which it conducts FID, focusing more on high-payoff units (such as those that have the ability to leverage Iraqi national authorities, have potential countrywide access, and already possess baseline competencies). Depending on the nature of the threat at this time, CJSOTF-AP's effort may involve an increased emphasis on key border areas.


Figure 4, (S//REL) *Ten U.S. BCT Set*

3. (S//REL) <u>Reduction of U.S. BCTs from Ten to Four-Plus-One</u>. The reduction from ten to five U.S. BCTs will end with the entire country in Strategic Overwatch. This reduction will occur at a rate of one BCT per month – with a "plateau" upon reaching seven BCTs. After a number of months, a further decrease in forces will resume until only four U.S. BCTs remain in Iraq. At that point, the Coalition will assume a posture consistent with an enduring security arrangement (described above in "Phase 5 – Strategic Overwatch"). This arrangement includes one U.S. BCT positioned in Kuwait as a theater reserve and one Coalition brigade positioned in Basra Air Station. During this "reduction set," CJSOTF-AP shifts its main effort to counter-terrorism, continues FID with select ISF units, and conducts special reconnaissance for CF.

Figure 5, (S//REL) *Four-Plus-One U.S. BCT Set*

c. (U) <u>Operational Risks and Opportunities</u>.

(1) (S//REL) <u>Operational Risks</u>. In the near term, MNC-I plans to achieve an improved level of stability that will create the momentum necessary for the campaign's continued trend of success and will allow for the deliberate reduction of CF. However, if U.S. BCTs are reduced from the current level of twenty *prior to*

achieving MNC-I's near-term conditions, then we must take steps to mitigate the following risks.

(a) (S//REL) Cycle of sectarian violence re-escalates and intensifies to civil war; Iraqis, the U.S. public, and international audiences view the Baghdad Security Plan as a failure.

(b) (S//REL) Current GOI fails under the pressure of re-emerging threats to stability.

(c) (S//REL) ISF fractures and/or deteriorates due to enemy and sectarian pressures.

(d) (S//REL) Militias gain legitimacy among constituencies as the population begins looking to them once more for security and services.

(e) (S//REL) Situation in Anbar province backslides into a state of tribal feuding and increased support for AQI.

(f) (S//REL) AQI and/or Sunni extremists establish sanctuaries in and around major population centers.

(g) (S//REL) Kurdish-Arab-Turkmen violence escalates over the issue of real or perceived Kurdish expansion.

(h) (S//REL) Neighboring states pursue their own interests more aggressively.

(i) (S//REL) Efforts to secure and develop key strategic infrastructure lose momentum, resulting in a significant loss of revenue for the GOI.

(j) (S//REL) Economic development in newly secured areas stunted and reversed with the return of instability.

(2) (S//REL) Potential Opportunities. In the event that MNC-I achieves its near-term conditions earlier than expected and the number of U.S. BCTs remains at its current level of twenty, then the corps should exploit the opportunity to commit forces to the following efforts.

(a) (S//REL) Conduct robust operations against illegal cross-border activity.

(b) (S//REL) Conduct focused operations to secure key strategic infrastructure.

(c) (S//REL) Leverage available military forces to encourage and facilitate the DDR process.

(d) (S//REL) Leverage sustained military presence to integrate international organizations, NGOs, and OGAs in an effort to "surge" governance and economic development initiatives.

d. (U) <u>Tasks to Subordinate Units</u>.

   (1) (U) <u>MND-B</u>.

    (a) (S//REL) In conjunction with ISF, secure the Baghdad security districts in order to protect the population.

    (b) (S//REL) Defeat AQI and neutralize the Sunni insurgency in Baghdad and Taji.

    (c) (S//REL) Neutralize VBIED and foreign-fighter networks in order to reduce sectarian violence.

    (d) (S//REL) Neutralize militias that attack security forces and intimidate the population.

    (e) (S//REL) Neutralize EFP networks.

    (f) (S//REL) Partner with subordinate area commands of the BOC.

    (g) (S//REL) Secure Victory Base Complex.

    (h) (S//REL) ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction, specifically the Bayji to Baghdad 400 Kv Line (Route: Bayji-Baghdad West Sub-Station), Daura Oil Refinery, the Basra to Baghdad Petroleum Product pipeline (Route: Basra-Latifiyah-Baghdad), and the Bayji to Baghdad crude oil pipeline. See Appendix 11, Annex C.

    (i) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Baghdad to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

   (2) (U) <u>MNF-W</u>.

    (a) (S//REL) Defeat AQI and neutralize the Sunni insurgency in Anbar Province.

    (b) (S//REL) Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence.

    (c) (S//REL) Neutralize VBIED and foreign-fighter networks.

    (d) (S//REL) Conduct tribal engagement to facilitate increased Sunni involvement in the political process, encourage stability, and further isolate AQI operating in Anbar Province.

    (e) (S//REL) Equip and train local security forces and integrate them into the ISF. *[GOI is in the process of formalizing this effort through the "Police Support*

Unit" initiative. This concept is under refinement. Guidelines for its implementation will be published in a Prime Minister Directive.]

(f) (S//REL) ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction, specifically the Bayji to Baghdad 400 Kv Line (Route: Bayji-Baghdad East Sub-Station). See Appendix 11, Annex C.

(g)
1.4b, 1.4d

(h) (S//REL) Facilitate the establishment of an Iraqi-run headquarters intended to coordinate security operations in Anbar Province.

(i) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Anbar to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

(3) (U) MND-N.

(a) (S//REL) Defeat AQI and neutralize the Sunni insurgency, with initial priority to Diyala and Southern Salah ad Din Provinces.

(b) (S//REL) Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence.

(c) (S//REL) Neutralize VBIED and foreign-fighter networks in order to reduce sectarian violence.

(d) (S//REL) Neutralize militias that attack security forces and intimidate the population.

(e) (S//REL) Neutralize EFP networks.

(f) (S//REL) Conduct engagement to facilitate increased Sunni involvement in the political process, encourage stability, and isolate AQI.

(g) (S//REL) Conduct stability operations to deny Mosul as a sanctuary for AQI.

(h) (S//REL) Monitor activity in Kirkuk; conduct engagement to offset the local effects of Kurdish expansionism and to prevent Sunni tribes from cooperating with AQI.

(i) (S//REL) Disrupt black market and oil smuggling activity that funds AQI and the Sunni insurgency.

(j) (S//REL) ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction, specifically the Bayji Oil Refinery, the Kirkuk to Bayji 400 Kv Line, Kirkuk to Bayji Crude Oil Pipeline, the Bayji to

Baghdad 400 Kv Line (Route: Bayji-Baghdad West Sub-Station), Kirkuk to Bayji Natural Gas Pipeline, Kirkuk to Baghdad 400 Kv Line (Route: Kirkuk-Diyalah-Baqubah-Baghdad East Sub-Station), the Bayji to Turkey (Ceyhon) Crude Oil Export Pipeline, and the Bayji to Baghdad Crude Oil Pipeline. See Appendix 11, Annex C.

(k)

> 1.4b, 1.4d

(l) (S//REL) Facilitate the establishment of an Iraqi-run headquarters intended to coordinate security operations in Diyala Province.

(m) (S//REL) Provide operational overwatch to Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah Provinces.

(n) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Salah ad Din, Tamim, Diyala, and Ninewa to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

(4) (U) MND-C.

(a) (S//REL) Defeat AQI and neutralize the Sunni insurgency in the Southern Baghdad Belt.

(b) (S//REL) Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence.

(c) (S//REL) Neutralize VBIED and foreign-fighter networks in order to reduce sectarian violence.

(d) (S//REL) Neutralize militias that attack security forces and intimidate the population.

(e) (S//REL) Neutralize EFP networks.

(f) (S//REL) O/O assume responsibility for Wasit Province and, later, Qadisiyah Province.

(g) (S//REL) Integrate the Georgian Brigade into the operational environment.

(h) (S//REL) Conduct sustained operations to disrupt malign, externally supported actors and networks in order to ensure achievement of Coalition and GOI strategic objectives (upon assuming responsibility for Wasit Province).

(i)

> 1.4b, 1.4d

(j) (S//REL) ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction, specifically the Mussaib Power Plant, Mussaib to Baghdad South Sub-Station 400 Kv Line, and the Basra to Baghdad Petroleum Product Pipeline (Route: Basra-Latifiyah-Baghdad). See Appendix 11, Annex C.

(k) (S//REL) Provide operational overwatch to Najaf Province.

(l) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Babil and Karbala to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance; O/O do the same for Wasit and Qadisiyah Provinces.

(5) (U) MND-SE.

(a) (S//REL) Defeat threats to local and CF security, including groups attempting to undermine the rule of law or subvert the political process through intimidation, with a focus on Basra.

(b) (S//REL) Conduct sustained operations to disrupt malign, externally supported actors and networks in order to ensure achievement of Coalition and GOI strategic objectives.

(c

> 1.4b, 1.4d

(d) (S//REL) Provide support as required to maintain CF freedom of movement along MSR/ASRs in AO.

(e) (S//REL) ICW the ISF, secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction, specifically the crude oil and petroleum product pipelines feeding the ABOT platform, and the Basra to Baghdad Petroleum Product Pipeline (Route: Basra-Latifiyah-Baghdad). See Appendix 11, Annex C.

(f) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Basra to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

(g) (S//REL) Provide operational overwatch to Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan Provinces.

(h) (S//REL) BPT provide a company-sized QRF in support of Camp Bucca should the security situation at the camp deteriorate; maintain the ability to respond with one platoon within thirty minutes of notification by the Camp Bucca commander, a second platoon within two hours, and a third platoon and company headquarters within three hours.

(6) (U) MND-CS.

    (a) (S//REL) Provide support, as required and within the division's capabilities, to defeat threats to local and CF security, including groups attempting to undermine the rule of law or subvert the political process through intimidation, with a focus on Diwaniyah.

    (b)

1.4b, 1.4d

    (c) (S//REL) Provide support, as required and within the division's capabilities, to maintain freedom of movement on MSR TAMPA.

    (d) (S//REL) Provide support, as required and within the division's capabilities, to secure critical energy infrastructure within AO and minimize the effects of interdiction, specifically the Basra to Baghdad Petroleum Product Pipeline (Route: Basra-Latifiyah-Baghdad). See Appendix 11, Annex C.

    (e) (S//REL) O/O transfer responsibility of Wasit Province, including control of FOB DELTA, to MND-C.

    (f) (S//REL) O/O transfer responsibility of Qadisiyah Province to MND-C. *[At present, the duration of Poland's troop contribution to the Coalition is not definitively known. In the event that the Government of Poland extends the mandate of Polish troops beyond Dec 07, MND-CS will retain an operational environment consisting of Qadisiyah Province.]*

    (g) (S//REL) Facilitate efforts of provincial authorities to transition Wasit and Qadisiyah to PIC and ultimately to self-reliance.

(7) (U) MND-NE.

    (a) (S//REL) Sustain non-kinetic operations to maintain current levels of stability.

(8) (U) CJSOTF-AP.

    (a) (S//REL) Conduct FID with select ISF units to develop their capability for independent COIN operations.

(b) (S//REL) Develop non-sectarian ISOF capable of conducting unilateral operations.

(c) (S//REL) Conduct tribal engagement to deny AQI and Sunni insurgent sanctuary.

(d) (S//REL) Disrupt terrorist and foreign-fighter flow along the Tigris and Euphrates River Valleys.

(e) (S//REL) Disrupt EJK networks.

(f) (S//REL) Conduct other Special Operations in ITO in support of MNC-I and MNF-I objectives.

(9) (U) 13 SC(E) [or Expeditionary Sustainment Command].

(a) (S//REL) O/O support Coalition Forces as they adjust their overwatch posture and basing arrangements.

(b) (S//REL) BPT partner with and assume TACON of newly-formed Iraqi Motor Transportation Regiments (MTR) until they transition to IGFC control; receive attachment of externally sourced transition teams for MTRs while those units are TACON.

(c) (S//REL) Continue to provide Technical Assistance Advisory Teams to Iraqi Regional Support Units, as required and IAW MNC-I priorities.

(d) (S//REL) Provide Contracting Officer Technical Representative and Quality Assurance Representative at each National Maintenance Contract site.

(e) (S//REL) Provide support to ISF as required in order to prevent ISF catastrophic mission failure.

(f) (S//REL) BPT support (with MNSTC-I lead) development of National Ammunition Supply Points.

(g) (S//REL) Provide General Support and General Support-Reinforcing to BCTs; provide DS/GS to MNC-I Separates.

(h) (S//REL) Provide common-item support and services as required and IAW MOUs and Army Contract Service Agreements to other services, Coalition partners, other U.S. agencies, or UNAMI.

(i) (S//REL) Retain expeditionary life support and sustainment capability to support forces operating in austere environments away from fixed sites; maintain 2 x Fob-In-A-Box sets (each supporting 1 x IA Bn) and 2 x Corps

Contingency Outpost Packages (each supporting 1 x CF Bn), pending appropriate funding and spending authorization.

(j) (S//REL) BPT provide movement support to MNC-I operational reserve.

(k) (S//REL) Establish and maintain the MNC-I container management program as outlined in Tab B, Appendix 2, Annex D of the MNC-I SOP.

(l) (S//REL) BPT provide aerial delivery of emergency common-item sustainment stocks (Class I, III, V, water) to support maneuver forces and transition teams in outlying areas as required.

(m) (S//REL) BPT provide support to CF and local nationals in the occurrence of collateral damage and catastrophic events.

(n) (S//REL) Manage IPE Warehouse at Taji and ensure contingency stockage achieves 33,000 sets.

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (U) Tasks Common to All MND/Fs.

(a) (S//REL) Conduct combined operations with the ISF.

(b) (S//REL) Develop ISF capability IAW Appendix 2, Annex C.

(c) (S//REL) Provide tactical or operational overwatch throughout respective operational environments as conditions allow.

(d) (S//REL) In PIC (or RIC) provinces, support PRT operations and continue to engage political, security, community, and tribal leaders to monitor the progress of governance and economic development.

(e) (S//REL) In PIC (or RIC) provinces, assist in the joint selection, development, monitoring, and completion of MNF-I funded reconstruction projects.

(f) (S//REL) BPT forcibly disarm ISF units that demonstrate illegal or destabilizing sectarian behavior.

(g) (S//REL) BPT withhold support from ISF units that demonstrate illegal or destabilizing sectarian behavior.

(h) (S//REL) Set conditions to allow the GOI to establish and develop the rule of law; safeguard human rights.

(i) (S//REL) Implement population control measures as appropriate and IAW Appendix 1, Annex C.

(j) (S//REL) Perform reconnaissance and collection tasks as outlined in Appendix 5, Annex C.

(k) (S//REL) Conduct information operations IAW Appendix 7, Annex C.

(l) (S//REL) Engage tribal leaders, religious leaders, and other local authorities to influence local populations and facilitate reconciliation (see Appendix 6, Annex C).

(m) (S//REL) BPT selectively close or open international border crossing points in support of GOI decisions to do so.

(n) (S//REL) As required, support IGFC initiatives to deploy Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad as part of the Baghdad Security Plan.

(o) (S//REL) BPT support the DDR process by various means, such as monitoring disarmament and integrating former militia members into the ISF.

(p) (S//REL) Support GOI and ISF as they establish security conditions ISO religious and special events that draw large populations.

(q) (S//REL) Provide distribution of emergency food and medical supplies for humanitarian relief missions as required.

(r) (S//REL) ICW PRTs, work with local authorities to develop reconstruction and economic development plans that will help the Coalition and OGAs channel resources to specific, appropriate needs.

(s) (S//REL) ICW PRTs, work with local authorities to identify potential commercial zones, help secure them, and channel financial assistance to them for business development.

(t) (S//REL) Coordinate with PRTs to reduce the financial incentives for Iraqis to participate in militias, primarily through private sector growth and the creation of sustainable, quality jobs.

(u) (S//REL) BPT provide provincial- or local-level capacity building support to individuals or offices that have demonstrated a willingness to provide services on a non-sectarian basis.

(v) (S//REL) ICW PRTs, facilitate regular meetings among provincial, district, and neighborhood councils to promote dialogue across sectarian lines and obtain funding for local development priorities.

(w) (S//REL) BPT provide security to USM-I personnel to facilitate their ability to conduct engagement in a timely and flexible manner.

(x) (S//REL) ICW ISF, provide security for infrastructure repair crews as required.

(y) (S//REL) Continue providing QRF, MEDEVAC, route clearance, convoy net, and sheriff's net coverage along MNC-I sustainment routes, including areas that have been transitioned to the ISF or have transitioned to PIC.

(z) (S//REL) Provide Middle Ring Security for UNAMI operations in assigned AOs; Middle Ring Security is defined in MNF-I FRAMEWORK ORDER, Encl 1 to Tab J, Appendix 6, Annex C and includes the responsibility to escort UNAMI personnel through the MNF-I operational environment when moving to and from their places of work in Baghdad and Irbil where separate arrangements are provided for their Inner Ring Security; MNC-I issues FRAGOs providing the specific details related to convoy escort responsibilities on a case by case basis.

(2) (U) Definitions.

(a) (S//REL) Strategic Cities. After Baghdad, the strategic cities are: Mosul, Kirkuk, Samarra, Baqubah, Ramadi, Fallujah, North Babil, Najaf, and Basra.

(b) (S//REL) Security. Sufficient protection against hostile acts to enable effective civic and civil life. [As defined in MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan, 30 May 2007 (draft)]

(c) (S//REL) Sustainable Security. Security that can be maintained over time through Iraqi security, civil, and civic institutions with reduced Coalition involvement. [As defined in MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan, 30 May 2007 (draft)]

(d) (S//REL) Political Accommodation. Negotiated power-sharing agreement sanctioned by the GOI that leads to the establishment of sustainable security ..., with consideration given to previously established protocols. Parties turn to political accommodation because they are unable to achieve their goals through violence; the GOI ensures non-sectarian implementation as the accommodations lead to long-term stability. [As defined in MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan, 30 May 2007 (draft)]

(e) (S//REL) Reconciliation. The peaceful resolution of disputes. A long-term goal. [As defined in MNF-I/USM-I Joint Campaign Plan, 30 May 2007 (draft)]

(f) (S//REL) Sanctuary. Sanctuary is a place where enemy forces have freedom of action to refit, plan, and direct operations. With limited centralized command

and control, the enemy is capable of sustained activity, has some capability to mass, and partially controls the area. Enemy sanctuary is denied if a commander assesses that the enemy benefits of sanctuary mentioned above no longer exist.

(g) (U) <u>Unacceptable Sectarian Behavior</u>. Sectarian behavior could be described as (but not limited to) the following:

1. (S//REL) Arrest or killing of a member of another sect for no apparent reason.

2. (S//REL) Extortion of funds from members of another sect.

3. (S//REL) Threats and intimidation directed at another sect.

4. (S//REL) Production and use of arrest lists that are based on sectarian affiliation rather than insurgent activities.

5. (S//REL) Unwillingness of Iraqi commanders and police to share "arrest lists" or to name the sources of intelligence that labeled people on the list worthy of arrest.

6. (S//REL) Unwillingness of an ISF unit or GOI ministry to protect or provide services to a community solely because of sect.

7. (S//REL) Unwillingness of a command or ministry to adequately resource a unit made up of soldiers from another sect.

(h) (S//REL) <u>Accelerants of Sectarian Violence</u>. An accelerant increases the intensity or frequency of the cycle of sectarian violence, providing momentum to the cycle. The opposite of an accelerant of sectarian violence is something that disrupts, slows, or serves as an obstacle to the forces that fuel the cycle. In real terms, an accelerant is a person or a group who perpetuates the cycle of sectarian violence by playing an active role in committing acts of violence against members of the opposite sect.

(i) (S//REL) <u>Joint Security Station (JSS)</u>. A JSS is a position from which *ISF and CF units* conduct operations to maintain presence in the local community and control key terrain. A JSS provides limited life support and force protection for the forces residing there. It serves as a place in which to conduct combined planning and pre-patrol/combat preparations, the point of origin and destination for patrols, a staging area for reaction forces, a secure position to which forces may withdraw, and a command and control node. Unlike a Coalition Outpost, a JSS will eventually be turned over to Iraqi control as ISF continue to conduct area security operations.

(j) (S//REL) Coalition Outpost (COP). A COP is a fortified outpost used to defend, observe, and conduct operations that allow CF to project forces into neighborhoods in order to protect the population and disrupt enemy activity. COPs are normally employed in restrictive or urban terrain. They can be manned by CF alone or in conjunction with ISF.

4. (U) **Logistics**. (S//REL) MNC-I develops sustainment plans, policies and procedures, and postures logistics assets across Iraq in order to support the development of ISF, while retaining flexibility to support counterinsurgency operations. Key to success is gaining efficiencies in fixed site operations through contracts and LOGCAP support, while maximizing expeditionary capability to support operations as required throughout Iraq without loss of momentum. Also critically important is development of concepts to support transition teams arrayed across Iraq while minimizing the logistics footprint; this may entail non-traditional support arrangements. While tactical level logistical support remains a service responsibility, every effort should be made to maximize efficiencies gained through common item support. This order will refer to the Sustainment Command in Iraq as the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) and the Theater-Level Command in Kuwait as the TSC. See Annex D for additional details on logistics.

a. (S//REL) Concept of Coalition Support. CFLCC provides EAC CSS, JRSOI, and Title X support to MNC-I through service channels. The ESC provides general common item support to all services and CF as required, IAW acquisition and cross servicing agreements (ACSA). The ESC provides general support on an area basis from nine GS/DS Logistical Hubs: LSA Anaconda (main hub), Tallil (Southern), Al Asad (Western), Al Taqadum (Western), Q-West (Northern), Marez (Northern), Speicher (Northern), Taji (Central), and Seitz/BIAP (Central). The ESC provides DS to non-divisional Army units and provides General Support Reinforcing to divisional units as required. Transition teams will be supported on an area basis, from the nearest MND or ESC CSS unit. When the nearest logistics unit is across MND boundaries, the two MND commanders will establish an MOA to allow for cross-border support to the transition teams. See Appendix 9, Annex D of the MNC-I SOP. Currently in Kuwait, the ESC's Special Troops Battalion (STB), as part of MNC-KU, facilitates the *reception, staging, and onward movement* of inbound MNC-I units. Due to the modular structure of the incoming ESC, there will no longer be an STB to perform this mission (see paragraph 4.d. "Logistics Transformation"). Consequently, MNC-I will develop a plan to address this shortfall. When complete, this plan will be published as Appendix 3, Annex C (MNC-KU Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement) to this OPORD.

b. (S//REL) Support to ISF. As Iraqi headquarters progressively assume OPCON of formations and ISF units, there will be a need for increasing levels of logistical self-sufficiency. In conjunction with Iraqi headquarters, MNC-I develops ISF logistical capability through partnership and doctrine development while providing emergency direct support as required to prevent mission failure. Development of institutional and higher-echelon logistics capability in the ISF is critical to Iraqi self-sufficiency. MNSTC-I and MNF-I lead the establishment of a Ministry of Defense institutional logistics system. The ESC provides Technical Assistance Advisory Teams as required to

Regional Support Units as they stand up to support Iraqi divisions as required and IAW corps priorities. The ESC provides partnership and accepts TACON of newly-formed Motor Transportation Regiments (MTRs) and ensures distribution support to MTR-supported Iraqi divisions. Upon MTR transition, the ESC releases TACON of the MTR, and the MTR is assigned to its supported division. Iraqi Headquarters and Support Companies (HSCs) will gain significant capability and will require MSC partnering and mentoring as they assume the support roles previously provided by MNC-I units. These units must be utilized to the maximum extent possible to distribute supplies to the ISF. Ministry of Interior forces (i.e., police and DBE) will receive support through MOI support systems, generally through local procurement and contracts. MNC-I transition teams supporting MOI units will assist the units in obtaining support through Iraqi channels. MNC-I logistics units will be postured to respond if Iraqi national systems fail, and ISF units are unable to receive support through MOD or MOI channels. Iraqi units cannot rely on the Coalition Forces to become a constant logistics provider in lieu of established Iraqi logistical systems. See Appendix 8, Annex D of the MNC-I SOP.

c. (S//REL) Support to other U.S. Agencies. MNC-I may be required to provide common item support, if available, to other U.S. agencies, CF, or the UN, IAW applicable MOUs. Coalition support remains a national responsibility. MNC-I provides common item support and services IAW applicable Acquisition and Cross Service Agreement (ACSA.) MSCs will provide monthly reporting of support required to Coalition partners.

d. (S//REL) Logistics Transformation. Shortly after the implementation of this order, the two senior most levels of the logistics "structure" in theater will transfer from "legacy" organized units to new modular organizations. 13 SC(E), which deployed with a COSCOM-like composition of units, will be replaced by the 316 ESC, which will not have a STB or a Materiel Management Center (MMC) that were resident in 13 SC(E). In accordance with emerging doctrine, the tasks performed by those two organizations within the 13 SC(E) (or previous COSCOMs) will now be "farmed out" to different echelons. The 377 Theater Support Command (Legacy) in Kuwait is also being replaced by a modular unit with the 1st Theater Sustainment Command. 316 ESC will be augmented through requests for forces until early 2008, enabling a smooth task migration and eventual transformation to a single command and control logistics structure.

5. (U) **Command and Control**.

a. (S//REL) Command. MNC-I is OPCON to MNF-I and is headquartered at Camp Victory. CG, MNF-W is TACON to CG, MNC-I IAW COMUSMARCENT OPORD 06-0001. CJSOTF is TACON to MNC-I and has a mutual support relationship when conducting operations in the AOR. MNC-I retains TACON of remaining IA Objective COIN units that have not been placed under the Operational Control of the Iraqi Army (currently 5 IA and 7 IA Divisions). The IGFC is an adjacent corps headquarters with battlespace within MNC-I's AOR, and is the first of several planned corps-sized command and control elements within the Iraqi Army.

Figure 6, (S//REL) Coalition Force Command Relationships

b.   (S//REL) Command Relationships. MNC-I maintains partnership relationships at the division, brigade, and battalion levels to advise and support IA units at the appropriate echelon. In terms of relationships, the term "partnered" equates to coordination through liaison officers at a minimum. MNC-I also establishes partnership with the IPS at the Provincial Police Headquarters, District Police Headquarters, and Police Station level to develop IPS capacity. Transition Teams are attached to the MSC to train, coach, and mentor ISF. Iraqi Army units TACON to MNC-I, (as per the MOU dated September 2006 between MNF-I and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD)), will maintain an ADCON relationship to the Iraqi Army.   O/O, IA divisions that are TACON to MNC-I will become OPCON to IGFC. MNC-I retains OPCON of NP units operating in MNC-I battlespace.

(1) (S//REL) IGFC Command Relationships and Coordination with IGFC.

(a) (S//REL) Currently, there are three control entities within the MOD: JHQ, IGFC, and the BOC. JHQ is partnered with MNSTC-I; IGFC is partnered with MNC-I; the BOC reports to the Iraqi Prime Minister and is ADCON to IGFC. The BOCAT (Baghdad Operational Command Assistance Team) is a liaison element from MNC-I and MND-B to the BOC (see MOU to gain complete understanding of the relationship between the BOCAT and the BOC). There is no command

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relationship between MNF-I and the JHQ. JHQ and its subordinate units are the supported command in those AOs they have assumed. The IGFC is under the operational control of JHQ. There is no command relationship between CF and Iraqi forces under the command and control of JHQ (to include IGFC). The IGFC and its subordinate units are responsible for planning, training for, and conducting COIN operations in their AO; the IGFC will coordinate with MNC-I for moves of battalion or larger units. CF may retain battlespace and FOBs within Iraqi AOs, but must coordinate all movement across Iraqi divisional boundaries – on a case by case basis or through established MOUs that facilitate routine movements along MSRs and within established Combined Operations Areas (COA). There is no requirement to coordinate for CF overflight of battlespace controlled by the IGFC and its subordinates. As required, MNC-I and the IGFC will create COAs; CF will revert to the supported command for the duration of operations inside the COA. CF will continue to provide support and force protection for transition teams operating in Iraqi battlespace and will coordinate their actions when possible.

(b) (S//REL) Coordination at the strategic level between the JHQ and MNF-I is facilitated by the Liaison and Partnership Division (LAPD). MNC-I has established a Liaison Cell with the IGFC for coordination. This liaison team is embedded in the IGFC HQ and has computer connectivity to MNC-I. MND/F will exchange liaison officers and interpreters with adjacent Iraqi units for coordination. At PIC they will be more dependent on the PJCC as the point of coordination with Iraqi officials.

Figure 7, (S//REL) *Basic Command Relationships (Current)*

(2) (S//REL) Command of Transition Teams. The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) will coordinate Transition Team issues between MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and the Fort Riley Transition Team training base. While the transition teams have been attached to the divisions, the IAG still retains ADCON responsibility of all National Level Transition Teams (IGFC, NP HQ TT, DBE) and for U.S. externally sourced U.S. Army transition teams during the deployment and re-deployment phase of the Transition Team lifecycle, and future external RFF transition teams (less PTTs) attached to MNC-I. The IAG will provide the full range of tasks necessary to receive, train, and redeploy externally sourced transition teams throughout their lifecycle to include oversight of team manning, initial team positioning assignment, and execution of the RIP/TOA program and policy development for Transition Teams. CG, II MEF (Fwd) has OPCON of all USMC transition teams operating in ITO. TACON of USMC transition teams operating outside MNF-W's AO but within another MND's AO will be passed to the respective MND commander; CG, II MEF (Fwd) retains OPCON of those teams. Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) and Border Transition Teams (BTTs) are attached to a U.S.-led MND and partner at the Division, Brigade or Battalion level. U.S.-sourced BTTs that operate in a Coalition led MND remain attached to a U.S.-led MND to meet U.S. Title X requirements are subsequently TACON to the commander of the Coalition-led MND. BTTs provide partnered Iraqi Army and Border units training, coaching, mentoring, and access to Coalition effects.

National Police Transition Teams (NPTT) are attached to MND-B as NP units are not tied to a geographic area and are susceptible to frequent repositioning. NPTTs with NP units that are operating outside of MND-B operational environment are TACON to the gaining MND. These teams will provide training, coaching, mentoring, and access to Coalition effects to their respective National Police units. PTTs are ADCON to 89 MP BDE and OPCON to the MND/F where they operate.


Figure 8, (S//REL) Basic Command Relationships (All IA Divisions OPCON to IGFC)

    (3) (S//REL) Succession of Command. CG, MNC-I; US DCG, MNC-I; the senior US MSC CG.

c. (U) Control.

    (1) (S//REL) General. Annex K (C4), OPORD 07-01, details the planning, installation, operation, and maintenance of Iraq-Theater Information Grid (I-TIG) services to MNC-I and its subordinate commands, to include SIPRNet, NIPRNet, CENTRIXS, SVOIP, VOSIP, DSN, RIPRNET, and Video-Tele-Conference services.

    (2) (S//REL) Coalition Command and Control. MNC-I will continue to conduct coalition command and control via CENTRIXS and Command Post of the Future terminals deployed to the MND level.

(3) (S//REL) Command Post of the Future (CPOF). MNC-I Knowledge Management Officer will continue to improve the CPOF program. Improvements will include implementation of Ventrillo voice capabilities and a partial reset of older hardware.

(4) (S//REL) Transition Team Communications. In addition to organic tactical single channel communications assets, all transition teams will have access to SIPRnet to meet operational and force protection requirements. MND/Fs are responsible for the provision of SIPRnet to their transition teams. MNC-I is responsible for the provision of SIPRnet to transition teams in cases where the demand exceeds the capabilities of the owning MND/F. MNC-I ICW IAG will continue to field the remaining VSAT systems to those MiTTs that do not have SIPR/NIPR connectivity or who are located in isolated locations.

(5) (S//REL) Satellite Bases. A satellite base is defined as any of the following: JSS, COP, patrol base, PJCC, or any other remotely manned outpost.

(6) (S//REL) JSS and COP Communications. In addition to organic communications assets provided by the MND/Fs, JSSs and COPs require SIPR, NIPR, and VOIP capability to meet operational and force protection requirements. MND/Fs are responsible for the provision of SIPR, NIPR, and VOIP capability to their applicable JSS/COP locations. MNC-I is responsible for the provision of SIPR, NIPR, and VOIP capability to JSSs and COPs when all available resources under the MND/Fs have been exhausted. MTOE equipment (i.e., JNN, CPN, SEN, LOS V1, etc.) should not be used to provide communications to JSSs or COPs. The use of MTOE equipment takes away from the self-sustainment of the BCT. MNC-I ICW IAG has an initiative to identify all JSS and COP requirements and use a VSAT solution to meet U.S. forces connectivity requirements. The Iraqi communications requirements for the JSS will be determined, validated, and funded through the MOI/MOD.

(7) (S//REL) Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR). SPAWAR is a government agency that MNC-I has an agreement with to provide MWR Internet Service throughout the ITO. SPAWAR subcontracts to McDean in order to provide the Internet and VOIP phone service to Soldiers. The internet service is free and the phone service through the purchase of phone cards bought off of [1.4a, 1.4g] at four cents per minute. SPAWAR is responsible for the training, distribution, installation, and maintenance of SPAWAR systems according to geographical and subscriber density requirements. See MNC-I Policy Letter C6-11 (MWRNET Internet Café Policy (SPAWAR), dated 29 Jan 07) in Annex K.

(8) (S//REL) IGFC-MNC-I Communications. IAW DoD Information Assurance policies and guidelines, U.S. and Iraqi data networks will not be physically or logically connected. IGFC-MNC-I information flow uses the following means:

(a) (S//REL) Liaison Officers. Both IGFC and MNC-I maintain LNO capabilities at their counterpart headquarters. The MNC-I LNO to IGFC has access to all I-TIG services, to include SIPRnet and DSN. Properly vetted data can be sent to the MNC-I

LNO for release or display to IGFC as required. The respective LNOs serve as a conduit for operational information between the two headquarters.

(b) (S//REL) Information Exchange Center (IEC). MNC-I establishes IECs at both headquarters to facilitate translation and exchange of administrative and non-time-sensitive information between IGFC and MNC-I. The IECs have access to all I-TIG services as well as dedicated interpreters.

(c) S//REL) VTC Capability. There is an on-going initiative lead by MNC-I FUOPS ICW MNC-I C6 to obtain a VTC capability to support the IGFC and IA Divisions under this command. The chosen course of action is to use a commercial vendor to establish a VTC suite of equipment totally funded by the MOI/MOD.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

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